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TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER WATER QUALITY
JESSICA OWLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Indian tribes are independent sovereigns located within the
United States. As sovereign entities, they have the same rights and
responsibilities that apply to nations of the world. However, this
sovereignty is limited by the unique relationship between tribes and
the U.S. government. Not fully independent, tribes are under the
protection of the federal government in a type of ward-guardian
status. The federal government draws on this relationship to
exercise power over tribes including regulating activities on tribal
land and removing tribal jurisdiction over certain offenses. Despite
congressional control, tribes consistently exercise jurisdiction over
the natural resources on their lands. Recently, Congress has begun
to acknowledge that there is a gap between tribal sovereignty over
natural resources and tribal ability to exert jurisdiction with respect
to those resources under existing federal statutes. In response to
this realization, Congress has added provisions to many
environmental laws clarifying the rights of tribes to control their
natural resources and prevent pollution on their lands. These tribal
rights are similar to the rights exercised by states with relation to
their natural resources.
One of the most far-reaching environmental laws is the 1972
Clean Water Act (CWA or "the Act"). In 1987, Congress amended
the Act to include a provision whereby tribes can attain the same
status as states for the purpose of implementing and enforcing the
Act. This article specifically examines the Clean Water Act and this
"Treatment As State" status provision of that law.
Section I of this article begins by addressing tribal sovereignty
over natural resources. Control over natural resources is an
essential element of sovereignty for all nations. Water in particular
plays a vital role in the lives of tribal members and control over
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water resources is an essential element of tribal sovereignty. Tribal
sovereignty over water resources fundamentally includes control
over water quality, including regulation of water pollution. Section
III sets the stage for tribal regulation of water quality by describing
the federal water quality laws. This section explains the Clean
Water Act's history and goals. Specifically addressing the
framework of the Act, Section III also explains the preference for
states as the primary enforcer of water quality and permit programs
and shows how this preference extends to tribes. Section IV explains
the role of tribes within the Clean Water Act and the recent
statutory changes recognizing tribal sovereignty over water quality
embodied in section 518 of the Act.
Because one of the main concerns with tribal water quality
enforcement is tribal jurisdiction over non-members, Section V of
this article examines civil and criminal jurisdiction over tribal
lands. Since violations of the Clean Water Act give rise to both civil
and criminal penalties, the evolving and uncertain nature of tribal
jurisdiction must be understood to address the concerns of states
and non-Indians engaging in activities that may pollute tribal
waters. Section VI specifically examines case law that deals with
tribal enforcement of environmental laws and shows the patterns
that are developing in federal courts. Section VII then examines the
Environmental Protection Agency's current practices, including a
close look at the Agency's reluctance to assist tribes in taking full
advantage of the opportunities that the statute allows.
The article concludes by explaining that tribes already have
inherent control over their water quality based on their status as
sovereign nations. The federal regulation in the Clean Water Act
merely acknowledges a power that tribes already hold and helps
establish programs to assist them in exercising their sovereignty
over their natural resources. Accordingly, section 518, the
"Treatment As State" (TAS) provision, exists to clarify tribal
jurisdiction, not to create it.
Tribal sovereignty over water quality is well established, but the
ability of tribes to prosecute water quality offenses and polluters has
not been clear. Section 518 addresses that problem by delegating
federal enforcement authority to tribes. Unfortunately, the EPA, the
entity charged with promulgating regulations to carry out the CWA,
has been hesitant in carrying out its duties to tribes as described by
the Act. Of particular concern is the EPA's interpretation of the TAS
provision. It fails to read the. Act as either an acknowledgement of
tribal power or a delegation of federal power. Instead, the EPA
draws upon complex language provided in Supreme Court decisions
to determine whether it is appropriate for tribes to regulate their
water quality. This interpretation is unnecessarily complex and
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contorted. Such an analysis is not needed in light of the clear
congressional language delegating CWA enforcement authority to
tribes. Thus, the Environmental Protection Agency's reading of the
statute as not a clear delegation is incorrect. Even if one were to
view Congress' 1987 TAS amendment to the Clean Water Act as an
abrogation of tribal rights over water quality, the tribes' rights
would then fall to the federal government. If the federal government
has the power to regulate and enforce water quality, then it has the
power to delegate that authority to a capable sovereign. The Act
should be viewed as a clear delegation of federal authority to tribes
based on their capacity to govern as sovereign nations.
With a clear delegation of federal authority, the Bill of Rights
takes full effect on Indian land for cases involving Clean Water Act
offenses. Extending these rights to tribal courts should alleviate
some of the concerns about tribal enforcement. A non-Indian
brought before a tribal court would be treated just as if she were
brought before any state court where she was a non-resident.
Additionally, the same possibilities for removal to federal court
would operate in tribal actions as in state court actions.
The course that may prove easiest for tribes, allow for fuller
participation in the section 518 program, and address the concerns
of both states and dischargers would be to remove all enforcement
actions related to tribal water quality programs to federal courts.
There is nothing in either the Clean Water Act or any other statute
that would require the enforcement to be in tribal courts. Instead,
the federal courts could try the cases applying tribal law. This
solution, however, is not without its own problems. Tribes may not
want federal courts interpreting their law. The tribe would not be
bound to interpret its law in the same way as the federal court did -
just as federal interpretation of state law does not set precedent in
state courts. This article concludes that tribes have not abrogated
their sovereign right to control their water quality and that the EPA
should not see any impediment to tribes setting their own water
quality standards and operating their own permit systems.1
II. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
ROLE OF WATER IN THE LIVES OF TRIBES
Tribes are sovereign entities much like any foreign nations. As
an element of this sovereignty, it is axiomatic that tribes should
1. Although this article discusses the routes available to tribes and non-Indians assuming
abrogation of the tribal right to regulate water quality, it does so merely to reflect the
discussions in current cases and language used by the EPA; not because the author believes
that there has been a clear abrogation.
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have control over their natural resources as long as they manage
them in such a way as to not harm neighboring sovereigns.2 Control
over natural resources is especially important for communities and
cultures that have a close relationship with their land, water, and
the natural world around them. Because of the tribal cultural
traditions and the development of tribes within the American
context, many tribes are particularly dependent on water.3 Water
plays a vital role in the lives of tribes whose economic base is rooted
in agriculture and fishing. As tribal sovereignty and culture is
passively eroded and actively attacked, basic control over natural
resources remains standing as one of the fundamental attributes of
sovereignty tribes have retained.
A. The Beginning of American Indian Law
Federal Indian law has gone through a strange and tragic
evolution. In colonial and pre-colonial days, tribes governed their
entire territory. They were sovereign nations; all persons entering
their lands were subject to their laws and customs. This situation
did not last. When Europeans began to settle the "New World,"
things began to change. When they first arrived, the newcomers,
including the British, treated tribes as sovereign nations and made
treaties with them. With the establishment of the United States,
however, the new government gained the rights and privileges that
had formerly been associated with the British colonizers and
disputes arose over whether the state or federal government was the
more appropriate holder of those rights. Because of concern over the
potential of Indian wars in light of settler thirst for Indian land, the
framers of the Constitution placed Indians under the purview of the
federal government. This relationship is not - so-clearly
established in what is now known as the Indian Commerce Clause.4
Johnson v. M'Intosh,5 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,6 and Worcester
v. Georgia7 firmly established the federal government as the entity
2. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 379-81 (2d ed.
2002). A cornerstone principle of sovereignty is the notion that all states enjoy sovereignty
over natural resources occurring within their territory. Id. at 380. An extension of this
sovereignty over resources affirms the right to control the terms and conditions of resource
exploitation. Id.; see also G.A. Res. 2158, GAOR. 21st Sess. (1966).
3. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES &
MATERIALS 830-63 (3d ed. 2000).
4. "The Congress shall have the Power ... to regulate Commerce with the foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes...." U.S. Const. art I, § 8 (emphasis
added).
5. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
6. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
7. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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with the right and responsibility to legislate activities on Indian
country and with Indians.' In Worcester, the Court held that state
law is not applicable to affairs within Indian territory, clearly
establishing Indian affairs and conduct on tribal land as a matter
of tribal and federal concern.9 This supported the earlier decision in
M'Intosh, which held that the federal government was the only
entity that could acquire tribal lands."° M'Intosh also explicitly
recognized a legal right of Indians in their lands, good against all
third parties." Chief Justice John Marshall first articulated the
federal trust responsibility to Indians in Cherokee Nation. He ruled
that although tribal governments were not sovereign governments
equal to foreign nations, tribes have their own unique status as
"domestic dependent nations."'2 He also explained that the federal
government owed a special responsibility to tribes including general
protection and insurance of tribal economic security. 3
Generally, Chief Justice Marshall seemed to view tribes along
the same lines as states. He specifically recognized the Cherokee
tribe as a body capable of managing its own affairs, explaining that
the tribe had been uniformly "treated as a state from the settlement
of our country."'4 Although this mirrors the current treatment of
tribes as states for the purpose of environmental regulation, tribes
were not often viewed or treated this way.
Since those early judicial decisions, much has changed on Indian
land. The rules that once seemed so clear proved opaque to
subsequent courts. Decision by decision, and law by law, the
jurisdiction of tribes has been whittled away. Beginning with
explicit congressional actions diminishing Indian sovereignty and
the right to regulate their own lands, tribes lost power. The courts,
not to be outdone by Congress, have continued this piecemeal
8. This firm establishment of course is only how we view the cases today. At the time, the
decisions seemed far from forceful. Although the Court was adamant in asserting federal
power, a lack of enforcement by the Jackson administration gave these decisions diminished
meaning for the parties involved. The nature of the federal government's power over Indian
affairs has changed over time. During the Marshall era, judicial decisions were largely based
in the Constitution and in the treaties made between the Indians and either the Executive
Branch or the British. By the end of the 1800s, treaty making had ended and Congress began
to exert a plenary power over Indian affairs. This framework is still in place today and
Congress legislates what can and cannot occur on Indian land. Despite their strong desire, the
states have never been very successful in securing much power over tribes.
9. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.
10. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592.
11. This right is usually called either "aboriginal title" or Indian title and will be discussed
in more detail in infra Section VIII.A.1.
12. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
13. Id. Marshall explained specifically that the Indians' "relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian." Id.
14. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
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crusade. Through a series of decisions throughout the later half of
the twentieth century, judge-made law chipped away at what
notions of tribal sovereignty had remained.
The picture has not been entirely bleak however. History has
been punctuated by instances of congressional turn-around and
judicial softening. Congress sometimes acknowledges that it is not
going down the correct road and makes a u-turn. Such was the case
with the repeal of the termination laws 5 and the end of the Indian
allotment policies. In the late 1800s, the federal government's main
goal concerning Indians was to assimilate them into American
society. Thus, it seemed important to get Indians off reservations
and begin integrating them into the rest of the country. Congress
decided to stop making treaties and granting reservations and
instead began to allot land to tribal members individually. 6 Many
existing reservations were broken up into 160-acre plots, which
were then given to tribal members. Any remaining land was sold to
settlers.' 7 The combination of sale to settlers, and Indians selling
their plots or portions of their plots led to a dramatic decrease in
Indian-held land.'" The 160-acre plot size was often too small to be
productive, and the individualization of tribal lands disrupted
traditional ways of life in both nomadic and agricultural
communities.' 9  By the 1920s, Congress realized that this
assimilation and allotment policy was detrimental to Indian society.
In a dramatic policy shift, Congress passed the 1934 Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA).20 The Act represented an attempt to
encourage tribal economic development and self-determination."
The goal of the IRA was to allow tribes to govern themselves with
some help from the federal government.22 This major departure from
earlier policy put an end to the Indian allotment. Tribes that had
not yet been broken up remained whole. Beginning with that law
15. In 1953, Congress adopted an official policy of terminating Indian tribes with the goal
of integrating individual tribal members into larger society. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong.,
67 Stat. B132 (1953); see also WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 25-28 (1998). By
the late 1960s, this policy was widely viewed as a failure and Congress began to rethink its
policy towards tribes. Termination stopped and some tribes even had their status reinstated
in the 1970s. Id. at 26-32.
16. Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §331 (2003)).
17. Id.
18. ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 151 (3d ed. 1991).
19. Id.
20. Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler- Howard Act), ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2003)).
21. See Douglas A. Brockman, Note, Congressional Delegation of Environmental Regulatory
Jurisdiction: Native American Control of the Reservation Environment, 41 WASH. U. J. URB.




and continuing to present day, Congress has been passing laws
creating reservations and allowing tribes to take land back into
trust. The notion of tribal ownership instead of individual tribal
member ownership is now well recognized.
This example of federal recognition of tribal rights and
sovereignty has also been seen in relation to natural resources.23
There is now a legislative movement towards protecting sovereignty
and recognizing tribal rights in natural resources. Congress has
constructed environmental laws that expressly allow tribes to assert
authority over their natural resources and environmental quality on
Indian land. Several laws now grant tribes specific status:24 viewing
tribes as equal to states or creating separate obligations and rights
based on the unique character of tribes as domestic dependent
nations.25
B. Over Water is Especially Important to Tribal Governments
Water is an integral component of Indian social, cultural, and
spiritual life.26 Many tribal nations have a strong cultural and
spiritual affiliation with water.27 Many tribes also assert that water
plays a special role in the spiritual lives of their people. Water
quality in particular is a critical natural resource issue for tribes
because so many of them depend on fisheries and irrigation. By
being able to set their own standards of water quality, they can
assure that the levels will be appropriate for religious or cultural
needs.28
23. Of course, the allotment policy also directly addressed a natural resource - land.
24. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act § 1451(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(b)(1) (2003); Clean
Air Act § 301(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2) (2003). The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (also called CERCLA or Superfund) authorizes the
EPA to treat Indian tribes as states for specific purposes, and contains additional provisions
specifically addressed to tribes. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d) (2003).
25. The term "domestic dependent nation" originated with Chief Justice John Marshall and
has remained a key element of the federal/tribal relationship. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. 17 (1831). This dependent status has often been likened to the relationship between
a ward and a guardian. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The tribe is
dependent on the federal government. For example, the federal government holds title to
tribal land and other property. It holds these things in trust for tribal members, with the
same obligations any trustee owes to trust property and beneficiaries. These unique fiduciary
and moral duties owed to the tribe may create unusual structures, laws, and relationships
between tribes and government entities.
26. Richard A. Du Bey et al., Protection of the Reservation Environment: Hazardous Waste
Management on Indian Lands, 18 ENVTL. L. 449, 450 (1988).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 364 (W.D. Wash. 1974)
(discussing the Makah Tribe's long history of connection to water, whaling, and a marine
lifestyle).
28. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 427-29 (10th Cir. 1996).
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To reflect their concerns about water, a number of tribes have
enacted comprehensive water codes that regulate water use on
reservations.29 These codes address both allocation and water
quality concerns. Courts have also recognized the importance of
water in the lives of tribal members. In Colville Confederated Tribes
v. Walton, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the State of Washington
could not regulate waterways on a reservation because the
regulation of water is critical to tribes.3 °
There is a significant tribal interest in environmental and
natural resource management on reservations.31 First, Indian tribes
have a unique relationship with the natural environment. Often
their culture and history are rooted in the land. For example, the
Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation's Supreme Court explained that
the natural world is an essential part of the Navajo way of life:
We refer to the earth and sky as Mother Earth and
Father Sky. These are not catchy titles; they
represent our understanding of our place. The earth
and sky are our relatives.. .Understanding this
relationship is essential to understanding traditional
Navajo concepts which may be applied in cases
concerning natural resources and the environment.3
Second, tribal governments are directly responsible for the
health and welfare of tribal members. As the political bodies closest
to a reservation's population, they are best able to determine their
community's needs and the condition of their natural resources. The
federal government has explicitly recognized this tribal right and
the desirability of having tribes oversee their activities on tribal
lands. President Reagan explicitly recognized the rights of tribes to
control their natural resources, stating "[t]ribal governments have
29. Michael C. Blumm, Unconventional Waters: The Quiet Revolution in Federal and Tribal
Minimum Streamflows, 19 ECOLOGY L. Q. 445, 477-78 (1992).
30. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir. 1981); see also
Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987) (striking down state
rent control ordinances on tribal land after taking into consideration the tribe's interest in
land use regulation).
31. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 322 (1983) (discussing the
federal government's recognition of the importance to the tribe to regulate game and establish
hunting regulations); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980)
(discussing the importance of timber resources in the life of the tribe).
32. Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 233-34
(1989). In his dissent in Brendale, Justice Blackmun noted that Indians have a "unique
historical and cultural connection to the land." Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 458 (1989).
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the responsibility to determine the extent and methods of
developing the tribe's natural resources."33
Third, control over resources is important to tribes politically as
well. Courts have found that when there is a lack of Indian
traditions in a particular activity, the arguments for tribal
sovereignty are given less weight when balanced against competing
federal and state interests.34 Tribes are particularly interested in
ensuring that reservations do not become dumping grounds for
hazardous wastes and pollutants or a regulation free sanctuary for
enterprises looking for loopholes around state and federal pollution
control laws. Because tribal governments operate under a different
set of laws than state governments, many polluters see tribal lands
as an attractive possibility for managing their waste outside of
many environmental laws and regulations. This difference in laws
combined with the tribes' historical lack of political power make
environmental concerns especially poignant and problematic on
these lands.35
C. Control Over Natural Resources is an Essential Element of
Sovereignty
Sovereignty is the inherent right or power to govern. The
inherent rights of all sovereign nations include the right and
responsibility to exert control over their natural resources. The
ability to control land and water is fundamental. Tribes have
traditionally had sovereignty over their natural resources. Even
when tribal authority has eroded in other areas, control over water,
soil, forests and animals remained secure.36 In Albuquerque v.
Browner, the Tenth Circuit specifically acknowledged the sovereign
interest in water. The court identified four essential elements of
tribal sovereignty as: water rights, government jurisdiction, land,
and mineral rights.37
As explained below, however, at present, federal, state and tribal
governments each have jurisdiction over some element of Indian
33. Ronald Reagan, President's Statement on Indian Policy, 1983 PUB. PAPERS 96, 98 (Jan.
24, 1983).
34. See, e.g., Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 720 (1983).
35. Allowing tribes a voice in these matters and giving them the power to invoke federal
laws has helped tribes to more effectively manage hazardous waste. See Beth Rose Middleton,
Contested Authority over Dumps on Tribal Lands: The Regulation of Solid Waste in Indian
Country (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
36. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Central
Machinery Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
37. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 418-19 & n.2 (1996). It is not clear how
the court determined that these were the four critical elements for tribal sovereignty.
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lands. All three governments understandably have substantial
interest in regulation of environmental pollution, because air, water,
and land pollution do not pay attention to political boundaries.
Federal, state, and tribal governments all have an interest in
protecting their citizens from the dangers of pollution.
III. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Because Indian nations are within United States borders and
Congress has plenary power" over entities within its borders,
including tribes, tribes must adhere to federal environmental laws.
In terms of water quality, this means that tribes must follow the
programs and requirements laid out by the Clean Water Act. This
section describes the Clean Water Act's general requirements,
including its preference for allowing states and tribes to administer
their own water quality programs.
A. History
Congress first began to regulate water quality seriously in 1948
with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).3 9 The
FWPCA protected water quality through ambient water quality
standards.4' These standards focused on "tolerable effects rather
than the preventable causes of pollution.' Cumbersome
enforcement procedures combined with "awkwardly shared federal
and state responsibility for promulgating... standards" to create an
act lacking the effectiveness needed to improve the quality of the
nation's waters.42 Since 1948, the FWPCA has gone through
38. Congress has nearly complete power over Indian tribes. It can pass any law affecting
tribes as long as the law does not violate constitutional requirements. This power has allowed
Congress to create reservations, terminate tribes, take over tribal resources, and to remove
adjudicatory power among other things. As the Court explained in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553, 565 (1903), "[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been
exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government."
39. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. Congress had been regulating navigable waters
since the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (RHA), ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (2003)). Section 13 of the RHA, commonly called the Refuse
Act, limited what citizens were allowed to dump into navigable waters and place on the banks
of waterways. Thus, RHA was the first federal law regulating water pollution. Courts
interpreted the act to regulate the dumping of anything that could have a deleterious impact
on navigable waters. Although an important statute on the books, it was not widely enforced
until more recently. Moreover, despite the fact that the RHA did keep channels clear for
navigation, the congressional interest in water quality problems did not blossom until the
1948 Act.
40. For a comprehensive history of the Clean Water Act see EPA v. State Water Res.
Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-05 (1976) [hereinafter SWRCB].
41. Id. at 202.
42. Id.
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frequent revisions. Most significantly, in 1972 a series of
amendments created what is more commonly known as the Clean
Water Act (CWA or "the Act").
The 1972 Amendments came about during a time of intensified
environmental interest in response to growing environmental
hazards. 43 After examining the state of environmental law, the
Senate Committee on Public Works concluded that "the Federal
Water Pollution Control Program... has been inadequate in every
vital aspect."" The sense of emergency combined with this sense of
inadequacy to inspire Congress to enact far-reaching comprehensive
legislation to combat water pollution. The dire problems of pollution
across the nation, including on tribal lands, showed that a national
system of regulation was necessary.
B. Purpose
Although the Act has gone through further amendments and
reauthorizations since 1972, its purpose and justification remain the
same. The Act's main goal is to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters.45 It calls for
the eventual elimination of the discharge of any pollutants into
navigable waterways.46
When Congress enacted the 1972 Amendments, it declared the
national goal that "the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters
be eliminated by 1985. '4 These ambitious goals were accompanied
by new enforcement procedures to help meet them. Not only does
the Act establish a system of minimum water quality standards, it
also describes mechanisms to enforce those water quality standards.
Of particular note is the Act's regulation of entities discharging into
navigable waters, creating a permit system for water polluters. The
43. One of the key events that led to this legislation for example was when the Cuyahoga
River caught fire in 1969. See, e.g., ROBERT ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS
LATER 5 (1993).
44. S. Rep. No 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3674.
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2003). The CWA delineates its jurisdiction based on "navigable
waters" which it defines as "waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 33
U.S.C. § 1362(7). The Act derives its justification from the federal government's authority to
regulate navigable waters, which is based in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
46. Id. § 1251(a)(1). The CWA describes several subsidiary goals as well, the most well
known being the "fishable and swimmable water" standard. Id. § 1261(a)(2). The Act
specifically states "it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water
quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by Julyl, 1983." Although the statute
does not use the words "fishable and swimmable," this goal is widely referred to using those
terms. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 43, at 8.
47. 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(1) (1972).
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Act imposes maximum effluent limitations on point sources" as wellas a requirement to achieve acceptable water quality standards.49
C. Regulation
The Clean Water Act regulates discharges of pollutants through
two main avenues. The first aspect harkens back to pre-CWA state
regimes where states set their own water quality standards. Based
on this tradition and a desire to protect and endorse federalism, the
Act allows states to regulate their own waters for the most part.
This relationship serves as a basic model of cooperative federalism.
Waterways must meet the called-for levels of water quality, which
differ based on the type of waterway.5" The Environmental
Protection Agency, as authorized by the Act, sets federal water
quality standards.51 At a minimum, states must comply with these
federal levels. Thus, although the states set their own standards for
the most part they must comply with the federal floor established
by the EPA. States may, however, go beyond these requirements
and set standards that are more stringent.
Acknowledging that an immediate cessation of pollutant
discharge was unrealistic, the 1972 Congress created this system to
regulate facilities and activities with the goal of eventually
eliminating all point source pollution in navigable waters. Thus, as
a second aspect of its water pollution regulation program, the Act
contains permitting programs that directly regulate the discharge
of pollutants into navigable waters.52 These programs are embodied
in the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit program described in section 402 and the Dredge and Fill
permit program of section 404. NPDES permits regulate discharges
from point sources. The statute calls on the EPA to create and
administer the NPDES system 3 and the Army Corps of Engineers
to manage the section 404 permits. 54 NPDES permits list types and
amounts of pollutants that entities are allowed to discharge.55
48. Point sources describes "[sipecific point of origin of pollutants, such as factory drains
or outlets from sewage treatment plans." RICHARD T. WRIGHT & BERNARD J. NEBEL,
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE: TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 661 (8th ed. 2002). On the flip
side of point sources are "non-point sources," which, as their name suggests, are sources of
pollution that are hard to identify. Nebel & Wright describe these as "[slources of pollution
such as general runoff of sediments, fetrilizer, pesticides, and other materials from farms and
urban areas... [ailso called diffuse sources." Id. at 659.
49. SWRCB, supra note 40, at 204.
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2003).
51. Id. § 1313(b).
52. Id. § 1342.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1344(d).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2003).
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States can also administer their own permit programs as described
below.56 However, because of the importance of federal oversight
and coordination, the EPA retains ultimate authority. Today forty-
five states and one territory (the U.S. Virgin Islands) have their own
NPDES programs. 7
D. States Have Primary Jurisdiction
Despite congressional concerns over state-based regulation, the
Clean Water Act establishes a pollution control regime where the
states act as the primary enforcers. 58 The CWA institutes a
program of statutory federalism, clearly establishing which
activities and responsibilities are federal and which can be
delegated to the states. Congress recognizes the interest that states
have in the waters of their jurisdiction and the importance of local
regulation.
States are generally more aware of the local environmental and
industrial conditions. Accordingly, states may set their own water
quality standards.59 State standards must comply with all federal
minimum requirements, but can be more stringent in their
regulatory scheme if a state so desires.
6 ° Further, section 101 of the
Act recognizes states as the preferred enforcers of both standards
and permit programs.6" Because of this status as "preferred"
enforcers, the EPA works with states to help them create acceptable
regulation and permitting programs. When operating with approved
programs, states take on the work of running permit programs,
monitoring water quality, and ensuring that the waterways of the
state meet both the state and federal water quality standards.
Under the framework of the CWA, states can attain the authority
to administer both the NPDES permit program and a dredge and fill
permit program laid out by section 404. EPA decides whether to
delegate administration of a permit system to a state based on the
state's capacity (adequacy of staff and funding) and its experience
regulating in the area (state water pollution laws 
and programs).62
Although the Act acknowledges the desirability of state power,
its existence is rooted in the previous inadequacies of state
56. Id. §§ 1342(b), 1370.
57. EPA webpage, State Program Status, at http://cfpub2.epa.gov/lnpdes/statestats.crm?
programid=45 (last updated Apr. 14, 2003).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2003).
59. Id. § 1313 (2001).
60. 40 C.F.R. § 131.4(a) (1994).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2004).
62. Robert H. Wayland III, Building an EPA/State Relationship for the Changing
Management of Environmental Programs, C352 ALI-ABA 83, 89 (1988).
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regulation. Because of overarching federal concerns about water
quality, the EPA sets minimum standards for state permit
programs, detailing even technology requirements. Additionally, the
EPA retains full authority over the permits, polluters, and states at
all times. Despite the fact that the EPA has never done so, it has the
right to revoke a state's ability to administer the regulation
program.63 The EPA also reviews all controversial permits and can
require states to reevaluate or change any permits that the EPA
administration does not deem adequate. Thus, the EPA acts as a
watchdog overseeing all the state programs and stepping in when
it spots an area or permit of concern. Because water quality
regulation stems from the CWA, it is a federal regulatory scheme
even when states are the ones enforcing the law. This means that
litigation arising out of such disputes can usually be removed to
federal courts based on federal question subject matter jurisdiction.
Congress made sure that states retained much of the
administrative power because, in many ways, the state is a more
efficient regulator of the environment."4 Disaggregating government
powers reduces pressures on federal government spending.6" Some
scholars argue that special interests can get a stronger hold in the
federal government where they only need money and one legislator
in their pocket; this is easier at the federal than at the state level.66
It is harder to spend money at the state level. State governments
are much better at balancing their budgets. They are more
connected to the funds they spend and take more care when
allocating monies. Additionally, states can monitor costs more
closely. 7 When regulating environmental conditions, states exert
control over land use and protect the health and welfare of their
citizens. Because environmental conditions vary greatly among the
states, local control over resource use and regulation makes more
63. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (2003).
64. The capability of states to make and enforce environmental law has changed over time.
State governments are larger than they were in the past with many states having significant
environmental departments. When states were seen as not having the capacity to administer
environmental programs, it was easier to argue that federal oversight was necessary. This
argument has become less persuasive. Today states have been delegated most of the operation
and responsibility for carrying out environmental laws. Robert H. Wayland III, Building an
EPA/State Relationship for the Changing Management of Environmental Programs, C352
ALI-ABA 83, 85 (1988).
65. Charles Fried, Federalism - Why Should We Care?, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 3
(1982).
66. Id.. This argument seems particularly unpersuasive - conventional knowledge argues
that the lower the level of government the more corruptible and susceptible to external
pressures. This is one of the reasons that we have federal laws and one of the reasons why
local planning boards tend to be so corrupt.
67. Fried, supra note 65, at 3.
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sense.6" All of these state-based arguments are equally salient when
addressing the concerns and strengths of tribes.
States often lobby to have increased control over their resources
and environmental amenities. States are not generally required to
administer environmental programs; they can leave it to the federal
government. However, despite the cost, time, and energy involved,
states generally take on any environmental programs available to
them.69 For example, only five states have chosen not to administer
their own NPDES program.7" States have made huge advances in
staffing levels and expertise since the Act first passed in 1972. 7'
Many believe that the only way to meet the broad goals of our
environmental laws is by having a successful concerted effort with
both the states and the federal government.2
The CWA encourages states to create their own programs that
adhere to federal standards and that are designed to meet national
goals. This interaction seemed appropriate for adapting national
water quality goals to local economic and ecological conditions. 71 If
states do not set their own water quality standards or develop a
state-enforcement program, the Environmental Protection Agency
administers its own standards and program. Thus, the EPA is the
default enforcer. As such, the EPA also serves as the enforcer and
standard setter for lands outside of state regulatory authority.
Because of this framework, the EPA also administers the Act's
programs on tribal lands for tribes who have not yet structured full
68. General federal laws have often shown to be inadequate at taking local conditions into
account. Although there is a need for uniformity and nation-wide standards, it is also
important to allow states to create protocols that make sense for their citizens. The
differences in environmental conditions have been recognized by Congress since the first
Homesteading Acts. The ignorance of western water conditions to eastern politicians led to
homesteading acts that did not fit the land. One hundred and sixty acre plots in the East or
Midwest are more profitable than plots of the same size in the arid west. Notably, John
Wesley Powell pointed out this discrepancy and Congress passed laws that allowed larger
plots on drier lands, the Indian Allotment Act granted tribal members 160 acres regardless
of their land conditions. DONALD J. PISANI, WATER, LAND & LAW IN THE WEST 11-16 (1996).
69. Robert H. Wayland III, Building an EPA/State Relationship For the Changing
Management of Environmental Programs, C352 ALI-ABA 83, 89 (1988). The fact that states
chose to take on water quality regulation programs despite the cost of implementation and
enforcement shows that states regard the ability to regulate their water resources as an
important one. As sovereign entities, states, like tribes, seek to exert jurisdiction over as
many areas as possible.
70. EPA, State and Federal Authorization Status, at http://cfpubl.epa.gov/npdes/states
tribes/astatus.cfm (last updated June 28, 2002).
71. Wayland, supra note 69, at 86.
72. Id.
73. Sally K. Fairfax et al., Federalism and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act: Now You See
It, Now You Don't, 59 WASH. L. REV. 417, 424 (1984).
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tribal water quality regulation programs or who have not yet
attained "Treatment as State" status as will be discussed below.74
It is important to recognize that pollution does not stop at state
borders. Conflicts often arise between states that share waterways.
This concern is especially salient when upstream and downstream
users have different water quality standards. The EPA has had to
deal with such situations many times. When states set conflicting
requirements of water quality, downstream water users receive
special consideration.75 Although the Act does not specifically
require upstream dischargers to comply with downstream water
quality standards, the EPA has the authority to direct such
compliance when it feels it is warranted.76 This example of EPA
power and the concern of national coordination demonstrate the
need for the federal water regulation scheme developed by the Act.
IV. TREATMENT AS STATE (TAS) STATUS
Originally, only states with approved programs and the federal
government had the ability to administer Clean Water Act
programs. In 1987, however, a new actor entered the scene. In
response to a desire to acknowledge tribes' sovereignty over their
own resources and affirm tribal administration of laws on Indian
lands, Congress passed an amendment to the CWA that requires the
EPA to treat tribes as states for the purposes of meeting the broad
goals of the Act.
When Congress originally enacted the CWA, it did not
specifically identify the governmental entity with authority to set
standards for waters on Indian lands within states.77 In the late
1960s, tribal self-determination emerged as the dominant federal
Indian policy. Statements by both Presidents Johnson and Nixon
established tribal self-determination as a goal of the executive
74. See infra section IV.
75. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.4(d) (2000). This regulation applies irrespective of who administers
the permit program.
76. Arizona v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 105 (1992). The CWA requires upstream users to
inform the regulating governmental agency downstream that could be affected by any
permitted discharges. 33 U.S.C. §1342(b)(3) (2003). The EPA's regulations state that no
permit may be issued "[w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the
applicable water quality requirements of all affected states." 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2000). This
regulation applies irrespective of who administers the permit program.




branch." Additionally, several congressional acts from the 1960s
and 1970s solidified this policy.7 9
Section 518 was added to the statute in 1987 to explain the
possibilities for tribes.8 ' This section of the statute describes two
main strategies for tribes: Cooperative Agreements (§518(d)) and
Treatment As State (TAS) status (§518(e)). The Cooperative
Agreements provision authorizes states and tribes to work together
to negotiate agreements about state program requirements and
implementation procedures. These agreements resemble interstate
compacts in that they are negotiated contracts between two
sovereigns within the United States. Section 518(d) gives a broad
sweeping approval for agreements of this type so that Congress need
not review each individual document. In these agreements, which
are subject to the approval of the EPA Administrator,81 tribes may,
for example, agree to allow states to operate Clean Water Act
programs on their land.
More importantly, the 1987 amendments authorize the EPA
Administrator to treat tribes as states for the purposes of carrying
out the goals of the CWA.82 The CWA further directs EPA in
"consultation with Indian tribes, [to] promulgate final regulations
which specify how Indian tribes shall be treated as States" under
the Act.83 In 1991, after a full notice and comment rulemaking, the
EPA issued a final rule implementing the provision and setting
forth the requirements tribes must meet in order to obtain TAS
status.84
TAS status acknowledges the equal footing tribes have with
states with regard to natural resources. Tribes can exercise the
same rights and responsibilities as states if they so desire. Tribes
78. Lyndon Johnson, President's Special Message to the Congress on the Problems of the
American Indian: The Forgotten American, PUB. PAPERS 355 (March 6, 1968); Richard Nixon,
President's Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970).
79. See, e.g., Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (2004); Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, 455-458(e) (2004).
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1377.
81. Id. § 1377(d).
82. Id. § 1377(e). Notice that this granting of "treatment as state" status could actually be
insulting to tribes. In essence, these sovereign nations which in theory should be considered
an equal power with the federal government are being down-graded to the role of a mere
state, a subsidiary to the federal government. Of course, in general, tribes are used to being
treated as lesser entities and thus they welcome this level of statutory security over their
right to govern their own water quality. See James M. Grijalva, Tribal Governmental
Regulation of Non-Indian Polluters of Reservation Waters, 71 N.D. L. Rev. 433, 440 (1995);
EPA Website, Laws, Regulations & Guidance, at http://www.epa.gov/indiantreatst.htm (last
updated Aug. 30, 2004); Improving EPA's Indian Program Operations, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,460
(July 28, 1994); Indian Tribes: Eligibility of Indian Tribes for Program Authorization, 59 Fed.
Reg. 13,829 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 123, 124, 131, 142, 144, 145, 233, and 501).
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2003).
84. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (1994).
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can act as states in the realm of grants,85 setting water quality
standards, 6  administering permits, 87  non-point source
management, 88 and other programs . 9 Like the system for states,
tribes can apply for TAS status for all permissible programs or they
can get partial TAS status and only administer certain elements of
the CWA.90 In general, tribes appear most interested in the ability
to set their own water quality standards. There are currently
twenty-three tribes approved to establish water quality standards
for their territories.9'
TAS status is an element now included in several environmental
laws: the Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, the Clean Air
Act and to some extent the Superfund Act.92 Tribes must apply for
TAS status for each law. But, after the first successful application,
the rest will be easier.
A. TAS Requirements
To be able to obtain TAS status, tribes have to meet several
requirements established by EPA regulations. They must be a
85. For waste management treatment works (33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1289 (2003)), for research
and training programs (§ 1254), or for pollution control (§ 1256).
86. They must establish water quality standards pursuant to § 303, comply with reporting,
recordkeeping and inspections requirements described in §§ 305 and 308, and enforce water
quality standards and other provisions according to § 309. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313, 1315, 1318, 1319
(2003).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
88. Id. § 1329.
89. Any provision of the CWA that applies to states can now also be read as pertaining to
tribes, including sections 1254, 1256, 1313, 1315, 1318, 1319, 1324, 1329, 1341, 1342, 1344,
and 1346. 33.U.S.C. § 1377(e). EPA has not treated the CWA's list as exhaustive.
90. Paul M. Drucker, Wisconsin v. EPA: Tribal Empowerment and State Powerlessness
Under §518(e) of the Clean Water Act, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 323, 341 (2002). No tribe has
applied for TAS status for all permissible programs. Id. at 394, n.127.
91. EPA, Tribal Water Quality Standards, available at http//www.epa.gov/waterscience/
standards/wqslibrary/tribes.html (last updated Nov. 2, 2004).
92. Safe Drinking Water Act § 1451(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(b)(1) (2002); Clean Air Act
§ 301(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2) (1995). The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (also called CERCLA or Superfund) authorizes the EPA to
treat Indian tribes as states for specific purposes, and contains additional provisions
specifically addressed to tribes. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d) (1995). There are also environmental laws
that do not expressly treat tribes as states, such as the Resource Conservation Recovery Act,
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act,
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act and the Pollution Prevention Act.
However, tribes have been successfully asserting authority over the areas those laws regulate
by drawing on traditional common law and notions of tribal sovereignty giving them the right
to regulate their own resources.
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recognized tribe93 with a functioning governmental body94 who has
clear jurisdiction over the waters they seek to regulate.95
The CWA defines tribe as an entity with a reservation.96 The Act
defines reservation to include "all lands within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and
including rights-of-way running through the reservation."97 It is
important to note that based on this definition, even land owned by
non-Indians in fee-simple can be covered by the Act's jurisdiction if
it is within the borders of a reservation. This is especially important
when it comes to regulation of waterways. Tribes do not necessarily
own the land beneath the navigable waters on the reservations.
Based on the Equal Footing Doctrine, many states received title to
the land beneath navigable waters when they entered the Union. In
some cases, this included waters on tribal lands.9" If a state is able
to successfully establish ownership to navigable waters and lands
beneath them, this would make those areas fee lands99 within
reservation boundaries. EPA has concluded that it will define the
term "reservation" consistently with relevant statutes and case law.
This means that trust lands formally set apart for the use of tribes
may meet the CWA definition of 'reservation' even where those
lands have not been formally designated as reservations."'
93. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a)(1) (2003).
94. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(1), (3) (2003).
95. Id. § 1377(e)(2); 40 C.F.R. §131.8 (2003).
96. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(h)(2) (2003) (defining "tribe" as a "tribe, band, group, or community
recognized by the Secretary of the Interior and exercising governmental authority over a
Federal Indian reservation").
97. Id. § 1377(h)(1). Deciding whether something is in Indian Country or on Indian land
can be tricky. The term "Indian Country" was given its present definition by Congress in 1948.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948). The definition used by the CWA is part (a) of that definition.
98. Ownership of submerged lands within reservation boundaries must be decided on a
case-by-case basis because many factors must be analyzed to reach a determination. For
details about ownership and jurisdiction over tribal lands, see Jessica Owley, California's
Public Trust Responsibility on Tribal Lands (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
99. Meaning that the lands would be privately held by non-Indians within the boundaries
of an Indian reservation. This status could be important for determining jurisdiction over
those lands. It is not always clear whether tribes have the power to regulate on such lands.
See, e.g. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
100. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on
Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,881 (Dec. 12, 1991) (relying on Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Citizens Band Potawatami Indian Tribes, 498 U.S. 505 (1991)); David F. Coursen,
Tribes as States: Indian Tribal Authority to Regulate and Enforce Federal Environmental
Laws and Regulations, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,579, n.13 (Oct. 1993). Also interesting to note is
that the CWA's definition apparently does not apply in Alaska or Hawaii, where, with one
exception, there are no reservations.
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The second requirement for TAS status is that the water in
question must be subject to inherent tribal jurisdiction. 10 1 The Act
calls for the water resources to be "held by an Indian tribe, held by
the United States in trust for Indians, held by a member of an
Indian tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust restriction
on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an Indian
reservation. ' It is not entirely clear what this requirement means.
Often, title to navigable waters and the lands beneath them lie with
the states. This could mean that neither the federal government nor
the tribe technically hold title to the submerged lands within the
boundaries of a reservation. State ownership of such lands could
mean that a tribe does not have inherent jurisdiction over the
waterways in question. 103 Thus, as a preliminary step to obtaining
TAS status, tribes often commence quiet title actions to assert
either tribal or federal ownership of the submerged lands on their
reservations and jurisdiction over the waters. This additional step
can add several years on to the tribes' process for attaining TAS
status. This burden further delays and hinders the ability of tribes
to regulate their own water resources.
10 4
The Supreme Court clarified and affirmed tribal water rights in
two important cases: Winters v. United States. 5 and Arizona v.
California."' The Winters case involved a reservation whose
boundaries reached to the middle of the Milk River." 7 When off-
reservation settlers attempted to appropriate water from the river
for agricultural use, the tribe protested."'8 The Supreme Court found
that when the reservation had been established, it included an
implied reservation of water rights to sources within or bordering
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(2) (2003). See infra Section V for discussion of jurisdiction on tribal
lands.
102. Id. If this language can be used to establish inherent jurisdiction, then tribes should
be able to successfully assert jurisdiction over any lands within the metes and bounds of their
reservation.
103. See generally Owley, supra note 98.
104. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho ended up in court when it tried to assert title to the
navigable waters on its reservation. The tribe was trying to establish title in order to gain
TAS status. Although the case went all the way to the Supreme Court, title to the submerged
lands was never clearly established. The Supreme Court never reached the ownership
question because the case was decided based on the state's sovereign immunity. Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997). When the tribe tried again to assert
jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit, the court upheld tribal ownership of the lakebed in question
and tribal jurisdiction over the water. United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2000)
(quieting title to land underlying portions of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River in the
United States as trustee for the Coeur d'Alene tribe which was categorized as a beneficial
owner).
105. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
106. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
107. Winters, 207 U.S. at 565.
108. Id. at 567.
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the reservation. °9 Additionally, Winters established that tribal
water rights are a matter of federal, not state, law. 110 Although
Winters makes it clear that tribal users have rights to water, it was
not clear how much water they had rights to. The Arizona case
involved determining the quantity of the water reserved. In Arizona,
the Court declared that the quantity reserved for Indian use is that
amount sufficient to irrigate all the practicably irrigable acreage on
the reservation."' Read narrowly, this case explains that tribes are
only entitled to the amount of water necessary for irrigation. This
narrow reading stereotypes all tribes as agriculturally based groups
and does not allow for expansion of tribal practices and economies.
A better reading of Arizona however draws upon the purpose of the
reservation. A federal reservation should be seen as reserving
sufficient water to meet the needs of that reservation. Thus, the
amount of water needed will differ based on tribal culture and
economy instead of simply on the number of acres of the reservation.
Because tribes grow and change, the amount of water reserved
should naturally expand to meet tribal needs. However, despite the
importance of the Winters and Arizona cases for establishing tribal
rights to water and determining the quantity of the water that
tribes have rights to, neither case touched upon what quality of
water tribes have rights to. Expanding the ideas presented in these
two cases though, water quality should also be protected under this
rubric. The Arizona reasoning can be expanded to protect the water
quality necessary to carry out the purposes of the reservation. For
example, because Indian reservations are there to meet the needs
of tribal members and entities, this need should automatically
encompass any cultural, religious, or health needs. Thus if tribes
assert that they need high quality water to meet spiritual needs,
that level of water quality was reserved at the time of reservation
creation.
To qualify for TAS status, a tribe must have a functioning
governing body that has the ability to enforce the CWA." 2 This
essentially means that the tribe must have a political or
bureaucratic infrastructure and funding.' Additionally, the tribe
must be capable of any activities it proposes to undertake."4 And of
109. Id. at 577.
110. Unlike other water rights, tribes do not lose their rights established by Winters for non-
use. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 405 (1998).
111. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963).
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(1) (2003); 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a)(2) (2003).
113. However, tribes with TAS status can also apply for grants from the EPA. Joe W.
Stuckey, Tribal Nations: Environmentally More Sovereign Than States, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.
11,198 (Oct. 2001).
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(3) (2003).
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course, like the states, a tribe must apply to the EPA to attain TAS
status. 115 Thus, tribes must be proactive in addressing self-
regulation in the environmental arena. This is easier for some tribes
than others largely because of the disparity of financial resources
among tribes. 1
B. Procedures for Approval
Tribal applications for TAS status go through a modified notice
and comment rulemaking process. EPA only allows a limited
number of groups to comment on TAS applications and individual
notice is not given.'17 Officially, only states contiguous to tribal
lands and relevant federal agencies (those that would be impacted
by the granting of TAS status) may file comments." 8
Programmatically however and with the EPA's approval, states
collect comments from interested citizens and submit many people's
comments to the EPA along with their own." 9
C. Implications of TAS Status
Once a tribe obtains TAS status, it has the right to set its own
water quality standards or develop permitting programs. Each step
of the process has to be approved by the EPA. After obtaining TAS
status, a tribe sets water quality standards. If a tribe wishes to set
standards that are more stringent than the federal minimums, the
EPA must approve the standards before they can go into effect. This
is the same process that a state must go through. Further, if, for
example, a tribe would like to administer an NPDES discharge
permit program, it will have to create a program and then obtain
115. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b) (2003).
116. Stuckey, supra note 113 (also noting, however, that the EPA assists the tribes with
their programs including providing staff support when requested). In his recent keynote
address at the 2003 Public Interest Environmental Law Conference, John Echohawk stated
that he believes that the sole reason that tribes have not attained TAS status is because they
do not have adequate funding. Although he acknowledges that there is funding available from
the EPA, he views this as either inadequate or too difficult to obtain. Public Interest
Environmental Law Conference, Eugene, OR (March 7, 2003).
117. However, the EPA does publish notice in local newspapers. Drucker, supra note 90, at
359; Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on
Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,884 (Dec. 12, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 131).
118. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (c)(2)(ii) (1994).
119. This makes little sense and deprives the state-only commenter requirement of any real
meaning. It is not clear though what problems this might create. Generally, there are high
tensions between tribes, states, and private landowners. This is nowhere more true than
where people are disputing water use and quality. Allowing everyone to comment may bring
in comments that are more personal, bitter. Usually only people who are against the status
will bother to comment.
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EPA approval for that program. Thus, the tribe must stop and check
in with the EPA every step along the way.
If tribes gain TAS status for either CWA permit programs or
setting water quality standards, permit holders may have to reapply
for their discharge permits following the tribal processes and
adhering to tribal standards.12 ° Permit holders may see this as a
significant additional burden. Because polluters are most commonly
industry and municipalities, tribes may have influential groups
opposing approval of tribal CWA programs. Although several tribes
have established their own water quality standards, as of February
of 2004,121 EPA had not authorized any tribe to issue discharge
permits.1
22
In the absence of TAS status, the EPA bears the burden of
administrating all CWA programs on tribal lands.1 23 When tribes
only take partial advantage of the TAS status, the EPA administers
the programs that the tribes do not take on. Because Congress has
plenary power over tribal land, the federal government, not the
states, should manage CWA programs. Thus, the EPA should be the
enforcement authority on tribal land. This would hold true whether
the tribe had no TAS status or only partial TAS status. This would
be the same power and enforcement authority exercised by the EPA
for states that do not have approved programs or have only partial
programs. However, the EPA retains the ability to delegate this
enforcement and standard setting authority to states.24 But, if the
EPA delegates the authority to administer permit programs to
120. Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945, 947 (D.N.M. 1996).
121. The EPA currently lists twenty-three tribes as having set their own EPA-approved
water quality standards. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Tribal Water Quality
Standards Available Through EPA, at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/
wqslibrary/tribes.html (last updated Nov. 2, 2004).
122. Drucker, supra note 90, at 344. Only two tribes had even applied and those applications
are still pending. Due to the current backlog of permits, the EPA estimates that approval of
NPDES permits will take five years. EPA, NPDES Backlog Information, at http://
cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/permitissuance/backlog.cfm (last updated Oct. 17, 2003). The Navajo
Nation has structured an NPDES program and is working to obtain EPA approval of their
program. The Navajo nation would be the first tribal entity with an NPDES system of their
own. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency
- Water Quality Program, at http://www.epa.gov/owm/mab/indian/navajo.htm (last updated
June 28, 2002).
123. This is because tribal lands are subject to federal, not state, regulation unless the
federal jurisdiction is specifically ceded to the state by statute. However, as is evident by the
Clean Water Act cases discussed in supra section V, states often assume that they can assert
sovereignty over tribal lands within their borders. However, if a state is able to successfully
assert ownership over submerged lands on a reservation, they may be able to regulate the
waterway despite the fact that it is on tribal land. See H. Scott Althouse, Comment, Idaho
Nibbles at Montana: Carving Out a Third Exception for Tribal Jurisdiction Over
Environmental and Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 721, 726-28 (2001).
124. Id. at 730-31.
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states where tribes have set their own tribal water quality
standards, the states still must comply with those tribal standards
when administering the program.
The EPA must consider tribal water quality standards during its
permitting process and the EPA must ensure that discharges do not
violate tribal goals. For example, when tribes set water quality
standards, it may affect the requirements of NPDES permits even
where the tribes are not the administrators of that program.
Additionally, upstream water users must ensure that their
discharges will not exceed tribal water quality minimums. This
holds true whether or not the dischargers are on Indian land. At
times, this can mean increased regulation if tribes have more
stringent standards than the state, which they usually do.
125
From the EPA's point of view, there are benefits and drawbacks
for granting tribes TAS status. The benefits include the avoidance
of patchwork regulation and an assertion of tribal sovereignty.
When tribes regulate Indian lands, they can create a coherent
regulatory system and avoid a pastiche that would only control on
member or tribally owned land within a reservation. As the EPA
explained when promulgating its rules, the mobile nature of water
pollutants makes it impracticable to try to separate water quality
impairment of tribal waters from impairment of non-Indian
waters. 1
26
D. Concerns of States
States are one of the most powerful opponents to tribal
regulation. They frequently oppose any efforts to either recognize or
expand tribal sovereignty. Indeed, the EPA's slow approval of TAS
programs might reflect concern over state displeasure. 127 States may
have valid concerns about tribal regulations of water resources, but
generally their arguments are either not well-founded or could apply
equally to state regulation.
1. Spillover Effects
States are be concerned about spillover effects from pollution on
tribal lands. If tribes have more lenient standards than states, then
state governments might worry about the ability of tribes to
effectively control pollution. Many reservations have significant
125. Drucker, supra note 90, at 342.
126. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on
Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,878 (Dec. 12, 1991) [hereinafter Amendments].
127. See infra sections VII and VIII.
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water quality problems. 12' However, because of the federal
minimum standards set by the Act, this should not be a significant
concern. Additionally, the EPA has established methods for
negotiating between states and tribes with differing water quality
standards. 29 Although not specifically bound by downstream users'
standards, the EPA considers differing water quality standards
when approving permits. Because of these concerns, EPA
specifically reviews such controversial permits.13 °
2. Patchwork Regulation
States are also concerned about patchwork regulation.' 3 ' Instead
of believing that exercise of tribal authority will solve the dilemma
of hodgepodge regulation, states argue that it actually increases the
problem. 3 2 If Indian tribes achieve TAS status, instead of states
administering one program for an entire area, there might be a
mixture of managing agencies and the standards could change as
one crosses borders into various Indian lands. Additionally, states
worry that they lose sovereignty when tribes gain the right to
regulate water.
133
There is some support for this because many reservations have
a checkerboard ownership pattern as a result of early allotment
policies; there are often many parcels of land within reservations
that are owned by non-Indians. Tribes always have the right to
regulate their own lands and their own members, but problems
could occur when states seek to separately regulate the non-Indian
parcels within the borders of reservations. Allowing states to
regulate the non-Indian fee simple parcels while either the federal
government or tribal governments regulate the Indian owned land
would lead to even greater concerns about patchwork regulation.
Checkerboard jurisdiction is worrisome in general because of its
potential to lead to applications of inconsistent standards, which
could undermine comprehensive environmental planning and
encourage enterprises to locate in areas with the most relaxed
standards.3 3 This is the classic race to the bottom argument where
tribal or local governments could be tempted to relax their
standards in order to lure businesses onto their land to create jobs
128. See, e.g., EPA Surveys Indian Tribes for First Look at Environmental Problems on
Reservations, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1424 (Dec. 19, 1986).
129. 40 C.F.R. § 131.7 (a), (c) (2004).
130. Id.
131. Amendments, supra note 126.
132. Id. at 64,889-90.
133. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 746-49 (7th Cir. 2001).
134. Brockman, supra note 21, at 154.
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and tax revenue. This concern seems less valid given the national
minimum standards for water quality. In fact, this concern
represents one of the key reasons behind the 1972 Clean Water Act.
It is unclear which regulator will best reduce the harms of
patchwork regulation. In some areas of the country, the boundaries
of Indian reservations are large and tribes could coherently govern
large acreage. Elsewhere tribal trust property may be small and
separate tribal regulation may not make sense. Generally, tribes
acknowledge when state regulation is best. In those situations,
tribes enter into cooperative agreements with states to allow state
regulation and standard setting. Additionally, both state and tribal
plans are still required to go through an EPA approval process and
the agency is unlikely to approve of any programs that would result
in degraded waterways.
3. Concern About Tribal Courts
More importantly, states worry that their citizens will be
disadvantaged and denied due process in tribal courts.'35 Non-
members are not participants in the tribal political structure. This
means that they cannot vote in tribal elections, run for tribal office,
or even sit on tribal juries. As mentioned above, they are not even
officially allowed to participate in the notice and comment
rulemaking process that granted TAS status to the tribe. This
means Clean Water Act violators may be subject to courts that do
not operate under the full U.S. Constitution.
In order to administer these environmental laws properly, tribes
must be able to enforce the laws in court. Tribes must be able to
assert both civil and criminal jurisdiction over offenders.
Specifically, to administer the Act tribes must put in place
enforcement procedures, which include methods of imposing both
civil penalties and, where necessary, criminal sanctions. This raises
not only the ire of private individuals and companies being
regulated, but also that of the states. In particular, many state
officials worry about what they see as an extension of civil and
criminal jurisdiction granted by the Clean Water Act.
Many believe that this is an improper extension of tribal
jurisdiction and use that basis to protest the granting of TAS status
to even the most organized and consolidated tribes.'36 TAS
jurisdiction results in tribes regulating both members and non-
members, including non-Indians. The conflict is not about tribal
135. Montana, 941 F. Supp. at 947.
136. This is one of the main complaints of the State of Montana in Montana v. EPA, 941 F.
Supp. 945, 947 (D.N.M. 1996).
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jurisdiction over tribal members, but over tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. The events at issue generally occur in Indian country.
They may be on tribal lands, member lands, or even non-member
fee lands.'37 Additionally, depending upon the state and tribal
programs involved, there may be requirements placed upon users
located upstream from tribal lands.
V. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Logically, tribes would have both criminal and civil jurisdiction
over all people and events on their land. This is analogous to the
power that states have. Even if you are not a California resident, if
you break a law while in the State of California, you will be subject
to its laws. Initially, tribes did have both civil and criminal
jurisdiction over their lands. This did not last long however. In the
Marshall trilogy of cases, as we have seen, the federal government
established its right to make decisions and create laws for tribes
and on tribal lands. 138 At present, subject matter jurisdiction of
federal, tribal or state courts usually depends heavily upon three
issues: (1) Whether the parties involved are Indians; (2) Whether
those Indians are members of the tribe asserting jurisdiction; and
(3) Whether the events took place on Indian land. All of these
elements, moreover, are surrounded by uncertainty. The following
sections explain the gradual erosion of tribal criminal jurisdiction
via both congressional and judicial action.
A. General Tribal Jurisdiction
1. Criminal Jurisdiction
Tribes long ago lost their jurisdiction over crimes committed by
non-Indians against non-Indians when they occur on Indian
lands.139 That attrition of tribal sovereignty prevented jurisdiction
137. Tribal lands are lands that are held by the tribe as an entity. Member lands are parcels
owned by individual tribal members. Non-member fee lands are parcels owned by non-
members (usually non-Indians) within the borders of a reservation. The member lands and
non-member fee lands are generally the result of an earlier allotment process that divided up
the reservation, putting land in the hands of individuals.
138. The Court made it clear in this period that the federal judiciary would oversee any
disputes involving tribes or tribal lands, but Congress did not clearly give judicial jurisdiction
over events occurring solely on tribal lands until later.
139. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (confusedly holding that the State of
Colorado had jurisdiction over the Ute reservation because when Colorado was admitted to
the Union its enabling act put it "upon an equal footing with the original States" and no
exception was made for the Ute reservation); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896)
(acknowledging that the Montana Enabling Act might have foreclosed jurisdiction over crimes
by or against Indians, but refused to believe that Congress could have intended to prevent
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questions from ever again being answered on purely geographical
terms. Within fifty years, Worcester began to lose its bite and the
straightforward rule that accompanied it 4° gave way to complex
case-by-case decision making that gradually eroded tribal
jurisdiction.
a. General Crimes Act of 1817
Congress passed the first federal law governing jurisdiction on
Indian land in 1817 in the form of the General Crimes Act, also
known as the Federal Enclaves Act.' Congress passed this law to
provide federal prosecution of crimes by non-Indians against
Indians and of non-major crimes by Indians against non-Indians.
Because tribes were under federal authority, it was originally
assumed that such crimes were not under state jurisdiction. The act
imported into Indian country the body of criminal law applicable in
areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction. The original intention
was to apply federal law to all crimes committed by non-Indians;
however that was frustrated by later Court decisions. A trilogy of
cases created an exception to the General Crimes Act. In United
States v. McBratney, Draper v. United States, and New York ex rel.
Ray v. Martin, the Supreme Court declined to extend federal
jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian lands between non-
Indians.'42 In each case, the Court placed jurisdiction in the state
courts. Rather than relying on state sovereignty, the cases suggest
that the non-ward status of the accused and victim divests the
federal government of any interest in prosecuting, despite the fact
that the crime is in Indian country.'43 Accordingly, McBratney, et al.
are expressly limited to crimes between non-Indians on Indian
lands.
b. Assimilative Crimes Act of 1825
In 1825, Congress incorporated lesser state crimes into the
federal criminal code and applied those crimes to federal enclaves,
including Indian lands within the states.' The act adopts the state
definition and sentence prescribed of lesser crimes for prosecutions
states from punishing wholly non-Indian crimes merely because they take place on Indian
country). Courts have consistently upheld these decisions despite their lack of clear logic. See,
e.g., New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
140. Worcester held that states had no power to regulate activities on Indian land or to
enforce state laws on Indian lands. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
141. General Crimes Act, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2003)).
142. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
143. CANBY, supra note 110, at 123-32.
144. Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2003).
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and applies them in the federal courts. These rules were extended
to Indian country through the General Crimes Act. Crimes of this
nature on Indian lands were brought in federal court whether
committed by an Indian or non-Indian as long as the event occurred
on Indian land. This law expanded on the jurisdictional restrictions
from McBratney by including a wider variety of crimes under the
federal government's purview without regards to the perpetrators
of the crimes.
c. Major Crimes Act of 1885
Eventually the federal government gained authority over crimes
between non-Indians and Indians while maintaining exclusive tribal
jurisdiction over all Indian crimes. This continued until Congress
modified it in reaction to Exparte Crow Dog.'45 Crow Dog 4 involved
the conviction of an Indian in a territorial court for the murder of
another Indian in Indian country. The murder was alleged to have
violated the general federal statute against murder extended to
Indian Country by the General Crimes Act.47 The Court held that
there was no jurisdiction because the General Crimes Act excluded
from coverage crimes by an Indian against an Indian. 4 Those
crimes were thought to be under the clear jurisdiction of tribal
governments. Congress reacted by passing the Major Crimes Act. 49
This was the first systematic intrusion by the feds into the internal
affairs of the tribes. The Court later upheld this exercise of
congressional power as justified by the ward status of tribes in
United States v. Kagama 5 °
The Major Crimes Act 5' provides federal jurisdiction for
fourteen'52 listed Indian offenses. This act represents the first
significant federal intrusion into internal tribal matters including
145. The Major Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1153 (2003)) was seen by many as a direct response to the Court's decision in Crow Dog.
CLINTON, supra note 18, at 37.
146. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
147. Id. at 558.
148. Id. at 572.
149. Major Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(2003)).
150. 118 U.S. §§ 375, 383-384 (1886) (explaining that "[tihese Indian tribes are the wards
of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States, -- dependent largely for
their daily food; dependent for their political rights. They own no allegiance to states, and
receive from them no protection. ... From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due
to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has
been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.").
151. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2003).
152. The Major Crimes Act originally contained seven offenses. CANBY, supra note 110, at
154.
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issues of self-governance. All persons prosecuted under the Major
Crimes Act are held in the courts used for other federal offenses. 153
Despite the Major Crimes Act, tribes continue to exercise
substantial jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country for non-
major crimes and civil actions."' Non-major crimes by Indians
against Indians are within the exclusive jurisdiction of tribes, who
also retain jurisdiction to punish non-major crimes by Indians
against non-Indians, a jurisdiction shared with federal government
under the General Crimes Act. Tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
embodied in several early treaties, ceased to be exercised as the
federal government assumed primary responsibility under the
General Crimes Act. Recently, in Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court
held that tribes have no power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians.' That decision was promptly reversed by
Congress in what has come to be known as the "Duro fix."' 56
In the 1970s, several tribes became dissatisfied with the state of
law enforcement against non-Indians on Indian land and responded
by asserting tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by them. The
tribes contended that such jurisdiction was inherent in tribal self-
government. This tribal position was rejected in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe when the Court held that the tribe lacked
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 5 7 That case raised the issue
of the tribe's right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
on a reservation. The tribe argued that status as a sovereign nation
granted it jurisdiction. Additionally, the tribe pointed out they had
not abrogated the authority in any treaty nor were there any federal
statutes explicitly removing its jurisdiction. 5
d. Public Law 280 of 1953
Public Law 280 (PL 280) changed the face of both criminal and
civil jurisdiction on Indian lands. Most notably, PL 280 granted
specific states civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country.'59
153. This Act was tested in 1896 with Talton v. Mayes. The Supreme Court sustained the
murder conviction of an Indian imposed by the court of the Cherokee Nation. Cherokee court
was based on a model and a written criminal code similar to that of the U.S. While the opinion
never cites the Federal Major Crimes Act and there is some question as to whether the Act
applied in that particular Indian territory, the decision may indicate the concurrent
jurisdiction of tribal courts over MCA offences.
154. This holds true for all areas except those specifically exclude by Public Law 280,
discussed infra. section V.A. 1.d.
155. Duro v. Reins, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
156. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2001).
157. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
158. Id. at 195-96.
159. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (in five specific states (California, Nebraska,
Minnesota (except the Red Lake reservation), Oregon (except the Warm Springs Reservation),
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The law made jurisdiction mandatory for some states and optional
for others. Any state could assume jurisdiction by statute or state
constitutional amendment. Several states assumed complete or
partial jurisdiction under this law. Consent of tribes was not
required. This law is directly in contradiction with Marshall's
decision in Worcester.'6 ° However, it did not terminate the federal
trust relationship. The act specifically disclaimed any grant to the
states of power to encumber or tax Indian properties held in federal
trust or to interfere with treaty hunting and fishing rights.
Originally, tribal consent to jurisdiction was not required, but in
1968 Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act. 161 That law not
only required tribal consent, but also allowed retrocession of
jurisdiction undertaken by either mandatory or discretionary states
under PL 280.162 This means that states that had exercised
jurisdiction over tribes could lose their ability to exercise such
jurisdiction. Tribal consent becomes the cornerstone of state ability
to regulate on tribal lands. No tribe has ever formally consented to
state criminal jurisdiction over its lands.
The effect of voluntary assumption of state jurisdiction under PL
280 on the federal jurisdiction conferred by the Major and General
Crimes Act is unclear. Arguably, the state jurisdiction conferred is
exclusive. In enacting PL 280, Congress did not expressly preserve
federal jurisdiction. In general, Congress has frowned on concurrent
jurisdiction because of the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy
implications. Section 7 of PL 280 originally indicated that
jurisdiction could be assumed by the states "not having jurisdiction
with respect to criminal offenses" as provided for by this Act. 163 This
suggests discretion and exclusive jurisdiction for mandatory states.
The Court later held that the Act did not confer upon the state
general regulatory power within Indian country in Bryan v. Itasca
County. 164
e. Williams v. Lee
In 1959, Justice Black asserted that despite the subsequent
changes in law, the basic policy of Worcester remained. In Williams
v. Lee, Black explained, "[e]ssentially, absent governing Acts of
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
Wisconsin; Alaska was added in 1958)).
160. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832).
161. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162(a) (2000).
162. CANBY, supra note 110, at 217.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1953).
164. 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (holding that states lack general powers of taxation and regulation
in Indian Country).
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infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them.""16 The Court further explained that PL 280
provided the sole means for states to acquire civil and criminal
jurisdiction over a tribe, and if they had not availed themselves of
that method, they could not gain jurisdiction through other
routes.166 Notably, the Court assumed that even concurrent
jurisdiction with states would unduly interfere with the powers of
tribal courts.167
f. Summary
Both Congress and the courts have continually changed the
complex world of criminal jurisdiction on tribal land. Both entities
slowly removed tribal jurisdiction over acts committed on tribal
lands, eroding tribal sovereignty along the way. Today, tribes are
left only with criminal jurisdiction over Indians who have
committed minor offenses on their lands. The major offenses are
matters of federal jurisdiction because of the Major Crimes Act.
Indeed, it seemed as though tribes would only be left with criminal
jurisdiction over minor crimes committed on tribal lands by tribal
members. In its "Duro fix" however, Congress expanded this to
include all Indians regardless of which tribe they are members of.
This small piece of tribal criminal jurisdiction was recently upheld
in United States v. Lara.'68 There the Court held that tribes had
inherent authority to bring criminal misdemeanor actions against
non-member Indians. 69 The Court acknowledged that Congress'
"Duro fix" was a legitimate method for recognizing tribal rights
holding that the congressional action was not a federal delegation




Despite changes in jurisdictional rules, tribes have always
retained the right to exercise civil jurisdiction over tribal members.
This includes clear authority to regulate the actions of tribal
members on-reservation.
165. 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
166. Id. at 223.
167. Id.
168. United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004).
169. Id. at 1628.
170. Id. at 1631.
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b. Over Non-Member Indians
Federal case law had developed to generally remove tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians and further to non-member Indians.'71
That would leave tribes only with jurisdiction over their own
members.172 For purposes of civil adjudication, the Court has made
clear its preference for drawing jurisdictional lines between
members and non-members, rather than between Indians and non-
Indians. Congress, however, recognizes an inherent authority of
tribes over all Indians, and passed a statute in 1990 to establish
tribal jurisdiction over all Indians.'73
Another important factor in determining jurisdiction is whether
the events took place in Indian country. The present definition of
Indian Country came from Congress in 1948. The definition is from
the criminal code, but is also used for civil jurisdiction:
[A]ll land within the limits of any Indian reservation
under the jurisdiction of the United States
government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through
the reservation
All dependent Indian communities within the borders
of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state, and
All Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have
not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through the same. 74
When a reservation is diminished, the land is no longer "Indian
country." Although a mere opening up of lands to settlement by non-
Indians does not remove the lands from Indian country, a
congressional decision to abandon the reservation status of those
171. This basic element of sovereignty was called in to question in 1990 with Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676 (1990). In that case, the Court held that tribes were precluded by their domestic
dependent statues from exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. Congress
quickly overturned Duro by statute. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2003) (recognizing and affirming the
"inherent power of Indian tribes ... to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.").
172. For example, in Colville, the Court permitted a state to impose sales tax on Indians
making purchases on a reservation other than their own. Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
173. Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1893 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
1301(2) (2004)).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2003).
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lands does. In cases where Congress has opened up lands to heavy
settlement, there is often a difficult question of fact of whether the
intent was to permit non-Indians to live and own land on a
reservation or whether it was to extinguish a portion of the
reservation. Cases have gone both ways.
In Solem v. Bartlett, the Court looked for magic language or an
explicit reference to cession or other language evidencing total
surrender of all tribal interest.'75 The Court found diminishment
because it recognized that there had been a commitment to
compensate tribes for land opened up to settlement. Compensation
thus became evidence of diminishment. However, the Court still
asserted that diminishment "will not be lightly inferred." '176 The
Court looked at contemporaneous circumstances and subsequent
treatment of the area along with the character of the land.177 In
general, it appears that congressional decisions to open land to
settlement show congressional intent to diminish tribal land.
Ten years later in Hagen v. Utah, the Court rejected the
contention that Congress was required to state its intention of
modifying the reservation boundaries.' 78  Contemporary
understanding and later demographics supported diminishment and
subsequent treatment of the area by the government was not
illuminating. 7 9 Most important were the words of an act directing
that surplus land "be restored to the public domain."'8 ° The Court
held that such language denoted a congressional intent to end the
reservation status of those lands. 8' The Court did not state that the
language was conclusive, but it put heavy stress on the wording.'82
Clear statutory language of cession combined with a
commitment by the federal government to pay for the ceded lands
shows diminishment. In South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, the
Court presumed diminishment based on the manner of negotiations
and the assumption of jurisdiction by South Dakota immediately
after cession.'83 The Court rejected the tribe's claim that the 1894
Surplus Land Act,"M by disclaiming any abrogation of the treaty
establishing the reservation, compelled a finding of no
175. 465 U.S. 463, 469 (1984).
176. Id. at 470.
177. Id. at 471-73.
178. 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
179. Id. at 410-12 (quoting 32 Stat. 263).
180. Id. at 412.
181. Id. at 412-13.
182. Id.
183. 522 U.S. 329, 344-46 (1998).




diminishment." 5 Because the act clearly modified some portions of
the treaty, the Court concluded that the disclaimer applied
primarily to payments promised in the treaty.
1 8 6
The Supreme Court delineated the elements of a dependent
Indian community in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government."8 7 The two essential characteristics of a dependent
Indian community are that the land be set aside for the use of
Indians and the land must be under the superintendence of the
federal government.188 Federal superintendence means that the
community must be sufficiently dependent upon the federal
government and that the federal government and Indians, rather
than the states, are involved in exercising primary jurisdiction over
the land in question.18 9 Other factors may be considered, but other
factors cannot be balanced against the first or be used to dilute the
primary requirements.' 90
c. Over Non-Indians
Today, it is generally accepted that tribes do not have the right
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. In Montana v.
United States, the Court qualified the limits of civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers on reservations.' 9 ' The Court held that the tribe had
no power to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-
Indian-owned fee land within the reservation boundaries.'92 The
Court drew on the status of the tribe as a domestic dependent
nation to strip it of this power. Despite this damaging decision and
later decisions that followed the Montana model to limit tribal
jurisdiction, tribes still have the ability to exercise jurisdiction over
nonmembers in a few situations. The Court in Montana specifically
delineated exceptions to its holding, explaining that in some
instances tribes do have the right to exercise civil jurisdiction.'93
Additionally, tribes can exercise jurisdiction when the federal
government delegates the power to tribes. This section explores and
explains the exception laid out by the Court in Montana. The next
section explains the federal government's ability to delegate
jurisdiction to tribes.
185. Id. at 342.
186. Id. at 341-42.
187. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
188. Id. at 527.
189. Id. at 521.
190. Id. at 526.
191. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
192. Id. at 557.
193. Id. at 565-66.
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When the Court ruled in Montana that the tribe could not
exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers, at the same time it
established key exceptions to the rule.' The Court in Montana
made it clear that tribes retain the ability to control internal
relations and self-governance and they can make tribal laws
governing those areas. When non-Indians enter into consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, they essentially agree
to tribal jurisdiction.'95 And more importantly, tribes can regulate
when the conduct of non-members threatens or directly affects the
"political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe."'" These two elements have become known as the
Montana exceptions. Thus, if a tribe can show either the presence
of a consensual relationship or conduct that threatens core interests
of the tribe, the tribe may regulate a non-Indian on Indian land.
(1) Montana Exception #1
Tribes may regulate non-members who enter into consensual
relationships with tribes. This is known as the first Montana
exception. It applies to nearly all reservation enterprises that are
subject to federal environmental laws. There does not need to be a
nexus between the consensual agreement and the regulated
activity. 97 Additionally, if a non-Indian has commercial dealings
with a tribe, there does not need to be an explicit arrangement or
contract in order for a tribe to successfully assert jurisdiction. 9 In
FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, the Ninth Circuit explained that
a non-native company subjects itself to the tribal civil jurisdiction
when it actively engages in commerce with a tribe.'99
194. Id.
195. Id. "Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements." Id.
196. Id. at 566. This ruling has been extended to preclude tribal court jurisdiction over a
dispute between nonmembers arising from a traffic accident on a state highway within the
reservation. The state highway right-of-way has been regarded as the equivalent of non-
Indian fee land. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
197. FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1990).
198. See, e.g., Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 1983)
(upholding Navajo regulation of non-Indians because of their business dealings with tribal
members on the reservation).
199. FMC, 905 F.2d at 1315.
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(2) Montana Exception #2
The second Montana exception is especially important, and at
the same time, open to interpretation. Whether an action or tribal
law relates to political integrity, economic security, or health or
welfare is not always clear. Indeed tribes could argue that allowing
enforcement of laws in their courts is always necessary for helping
to retain and establish the political integrity of their sovereign
nation. Courts however have not expanded the ruling that far.
However, the second Montana exception always applies to
enterprises subject to federal pollution control laws. Water pollution
is unquestionably a direct threat to tribal health and welfare.
20 0
Additionally, degradation of tribal waters can affect tribal economic
security by decreasing the value of tribal lands located near polluted
waters. Further, pollution can affect a tribe's political integrity
when states refuse to recognize tribal power.
The Court specifically discussed the limitations of the second
Montana exception in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, a case about
tribal zoning laws.2 1 Two non-members owning property on the
reservation sought to subdivide their parcels. Although they both
proposed actions permissible under County zoning laws, the
subdivisions would have violated the tribal zoning ordinances.2 2
There was no one clear decision in Brendale. A combination of
Justice White's plurality opinion and Justice Stevens' concurrence,
led to an unusual outcome. The Court made a distinction among
land types on the reservation. Parts of the reservation that had at
one point been opened up for non-Indian settlement were referred
to as "open areas" while sections that were owned by the tribe were
"closed areas." Because tribes did not have the ability to exclude
non-members from these open areas, they lost some of their
sovereignty over these areas. The Court considers the right to
exclude the essence of sovereignty over tribal lands. When tribes are
unable to exclude people from their land, the Court regards tribal
authority as eroded. In Brendale, the ability to exclude was used to
determine the lands where tribes could not regulate.
In Brendale, Justice White writing for a plurality narrowly
interpreted the second Montana exception, concluding that it did not
200. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Montana v.
Naman, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the tribe had authority to regulate riparian
water rights for both everyone owning property either on or bordering the reservation because
of the potential impacts of tribal health and welfare).
201. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
202. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
418 (1989).
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apply to every situation where a tribe is adversely affected. 2 3 The
Court found it significant that the language referred now referred
to as the second Montana exception, was prefaced by the word
"may. ' 2°4 To the Court, this indicated that a tribe's authority need
not extend to all conduct that "threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe. 20 5
The Brendale decision could be harmful for tribes seeking to
regulate activities on non-Indian fee lands within their reservations.
If the reservations have been opened to settlement, have the tribes
lost the ability to exclude and therefore their ability to regulate the
activities of non-Indians on these lands?
Of particular note, though, is the way the Court treated a tribe's
ability to zone. Justice White did not believe that the county's
zoning ordinance seriously threatened tribal interests. Under that
framework, tribes would have to show that both state and federal
water quality regulation would threaten key tribal interests. That
would likely be hard to establish, but could be done if the tribe had
significantly higher water quality standards than the federal or
state standards. This may occur with tribes who draw upon their
waters for religious and cultural uses.
Several years after Brendale, the Court again looked at the
relationship between the second Montana exception and a tribe's
ability to exclude nonmembers. In 1997, the Court whittled away at
tribal jurisdiction even more in Strate v. A-I Contractors."6 The case
involved a car accident on a state highway that traversed tribal
lands. Although the state highway was on tribal land, the tribe had
granted a right-of-way to the state. This right-of-way precluded the
tribe from exercising proprietary rights of exclusion. Because the
tribe could not exclude non-Indians from the land, the Court viewed
the land as similar to non-Indian fee land within a reservation. °7
This case could be especially harmful for examining ownership
of riverbeds. Not only has the Court limited realms of tribal
jurisdiction, it has set a dangerous precedent by making the ability
to exclude the test for tribal jurisdiction. Thus, even if a tribe can
show ownership of navigable waters and submerged lands, it may
not have jurisdiction to try cases arising out of activities or incidents
on these lands. Because navigable waters are subject to a federal
navigational servitude, a tribe may not be able to restrict who can
203. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 431.
204. Id. at 428.
205. Id. at 428-29 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
206. 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
207. Id. at 1413.
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use waters running through its land for navigation. If a tribe cannot
bar boats from using a river, it may have lost their ability to exclude
and therefore lost jurisdiction over those areas based on Strate. The
Court specifically limited the second Montana exception, explaining
that the key level of analysis is determining whether state
regulation in the area would "trench unduly on tribal self-
government.""2 Referring to Montana, the Court explained that a
tribe's power does not reach "beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations. 2 °9
Even with Strate, a tribe can try to invoke one of the Montana
exceptions in order to regulate activities on navigable waters and
submerged lands within their jurisdiction. It will depend on how the
tribe is able to define its interest in regulation. In Strate, the tribe's
interest in safe driving was not sufficient to qualify for the second
Montana exception. This requirement may be more easily satisfied
when tribes are seeking to retain their ability to fish or to protect
waterways based on cultural and religious motivation. Because each
tribe will have to individualize the reasoning for regulation of water
quality, there is no clear answer to the jurisdictional problem. Each
tribe will have to go through case-by-case adjudication. However,
the Ninth Circuit did recently state that it would be "difficult to
imagine how serious threats to water quality could not have
profound implications for tribal self-government. 210
The combinative force of Montana and Strate show that it will
be difficult for a tribe to regulate activities affecting waters if the
state is deemed to own the land. If a tribe owns the land subject to
a state public trust servitude, it could also lose jurisdiction over non-
Indian activities affecting water quality under Strate.
After Strate and Montana, we see that the general background
Indian law presumptions have changed. Instead of presuming tribal
power exists and looking for specific federal language abrogating
tribal authority, the Court presumes the power is absent. Now the
analysis begins by looking for specific grants of authority to tribes
instead of specific language overriding tribal power.
208. Strate, 520 U.S. at 458. In Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 229 F.3d 1210, 1220 (9th Cir.
2000), the Ninth Circuit also emphasized that the second Montana exception be narrowly
construed. Otherwise, the exception would "swallow the rule because virtually every act that
occurs on the reservation could be argued to have some political, economic, health or welfare
ramification to the tribe." Bugenig, 229 F.3d at 1220. The Bugenig Court limited the exception
to the extent that tribal jurisdiction is "necessary to protect self-government or to control
internal relations." Id.
209. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
210. Bugenig, 229 F.3d at 1222.
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3. Expressly Delegated Jurisdiction
Congress may expressly authorize tribal jurisdiction over fee
lands. In Montana, the Court noted that Congress has the power to
grant or delegate jurisdiction over nonmembers to tribes, but such
jurisdiction will not be presumed.211 There must be an express
statement by Congress that it intends the tribe to exercise such
authority. The federal government can delegate anything within its
power to tribal governments. Although Congress cannot delegate its
duties and responsibilities to private entities, tribes are viewed
differently. Because tribes are sovereign entities, they have the
ability to take on governmental powers.
With section 518 of the CWA, Congress expressly delegated
tribes the authority to enforce water quality standards. This is a
way that the situation in Brendale can be further distinguished
from the tribal rights to regulate water quality. The Brendale Court
stressed the fact that Congress did not expressly delegate the power
to zone fee lands to tribes.212
4. Summary
It is clear that tribes have the right to regulate activities of
tribal members on-reservation. Tribes can assert both criminal and
civil jurisdiction over their members. Additionally, as a result of the
"Duro fix," tribes can assert jurisdiction over non-member Indians
for minor criminal offenses. Tribes do not have the ability to
exercise criminal jurisdiction of any kind over non-Indians even
when offenses occur on tribal lands.
Tribes have retained the ability to assert civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians and non-member Indians in several situations. Tribal
civil laws can be upheld against non-Indians under the two
situations laid out by Montana: (1) when the non-Indian and the
tribe have entered into a contractual agreement; and (2) when the
tribal regulation is necessary to protect the political integrity,
economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe.
Additionally, tribes can assert either civil or criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians when the federal government has
delegated them the power to do so. The federal government may
delegate the ability of tribal governments to regulate anything that
the federal government had the authority to regulate. Tribes have
the ability to exercise meaningful jurisdiction over their water
quality because such jurisdiction fits within the Montana exceptions
211. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
212. Brendale, 492 U.S at 428.
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and because the federal government has specifically delegated
authority to tribes.
B. Tribal Jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act's grant of authority to tribes arises in the
midst of this complex jurisdictional history. A plain reading of the
Clean Water Act shows both an acknowledgement of already
existing tribal sovereignty and an unambiguous delegation of
federal authority to tribes. Although tribes already had sovereignty
over their water quality and hence the right to set water quality
standards, section 518 solidified the right and the process. Although
tribal sovereignty in this area was clear before the change to the
CWA, tribal jurisdiction over non-members was not, as
demonstrated above. This is why section 518 provides tribes with
federally delegated jurisdiction over non-Indians.213
The Supreme Court has actually cited the CWA as an example
of express delegation to tribes.214 The Montana District Court
acknowledged that the CWA shows a clear federal intention to
delegate jurisdiction.21 Some also argue that common sense
requires a full delegation of CWA authority to tribes.216 Without full
ability to enforce CWA regulations, tribal administration of permit
programs becomes meaningless.217 Congress would not have
intended to grant such piecemeal jurisdiction.21
The EPA, however, has been unwilling to read the CWA as a
clear delegation of federal authority to tribes.219 Instead of stopping
with the plain language of the Act, the EPA draws upon legislative
history. When the EPA reviewed the legislative history, it found it
to be conflicting. "Given that the legislative history ultimately is
ambiguous and inconclusive, EPA believes that it should not find
that the statute expands or limits the scope of Tribal authority
beyond that inherent in the Tribe absent an express indication of
213. Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945, 951 (D.N.M. 1996). This is clear when examining
subsection (h), which expressly defines Indian reservation to include all lands
"notwithstanding the issuance of any patent." And when subsection (e) specifies which
resources tribes can hold, it outlines areas "within the borders of an Indian reservation."
214. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 428.
215. Montana, 941 F. Supp. at 951.
216. Id. at 952.
217. However, the tribes still gain something by being able to set water quality standards
as long as they can ensure enforcement of those standards by either state or federal courts
which at the moment is still uncertain.
218. Montana, 941 F. Supp. at 952.
219. This is especially curious because the EPA does rely on congressional delegation for
justifying the tribal authority in the Clean Air Act. Perhaps this is because the CWA statute
was early on the scene and the CAA did not incorporate tribal authority officially until 1991
after several court cases had already addressed the issue.
Fall, 2004]
JOURNAL OF LAND USE
Congressional intent to do so."22 Instead, the EPA draws upon
common law to establish a case-by-case framework. The EPA
prefers a case-by-case determination over nonmember fee lands so
it can examine the "potential threats against water quality as they
relate to a particular Tribe's health or welfare. 221
When promulgating its regulations for the TAS process, the EPA
used Montana and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation to analyze inherent tribal authority.222 To
gain TAS status, tribes must show that the second Montana
exception applies to them. Thus, a tribe must demonstrate that
regulation over water quality relates to "conduct [that] threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, economic security,
or health or welfare of the tribe." '223 Relying heavily on Montana, the
EPA concluded that the CWA statute was neither a plenary
delegation of inherent authority to tribes to regulate all reservation
waters, nor a standard that precluded tribal regulation of any non-
member or off-reservation activity.224 The EPA also acknowledged,
however, that the Montana exception and the standards for gaining
TAS status would generally be easy to meet because the
determination will "be an easy showing, based on 'generalized
findings' that water quality is related to human health and
welfare." '225 Once a tribe has shown that impairment of the waters
on their reservation would have a serious and substantial effect on
the health and welfare of the tribe, the EPA presumes that there
has been an adequate showing of inherent authority.226
VI. ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
Since EPA's promulgation of Clean Water Act regulations
pertaining to tribes in 1991, there have been a few significant
federal court cases reviewing the validity of these rules and the
extent of tribal jurisdiction under the CWA. Additionally, some non-
Clean Water Act cases also explain tribal sovereignty in relation to
natural resources and environmental laws. These general cases
combine with the recent Clean Water Act cases to give broad scope
to tribal regulation of water resources. In each case, the federal
courts deferred to EPA interpretation of federal law and upheld
tribal jurisdiction over water resources.
220. Amendments, supra note 126, at 64,880.
221. Montana, 941 F. Supp. at 953.
222. Amendments, supra note 126, at 64,876.
223. Montana, 450 U.S. at 577-79.
224. Amendments, supra note 126, at 64,877.
225. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing 56 F.R. at 64,878).
226. Amendments, supra note 126, at 64,879.
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A. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
In Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit
held that a tribe's sovereignty does not disappear when the federal
government takes responsibility for management of a particular
federal program on Indian lands.227 In this 1985 decision, the court
found EPA justified in blocking the inclusion of tribal lands in a
state's waste management program under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).228 This decision reaffirmed
the federal policy of encouraging "[t]ribal self-government in
environmental matters." '229 The court held that RCRA did not
authorize states to regulate Indians on Indian lands, but did not
answer the question of whether the state could properly regulate a
program over non-Indians in Indian country.23 ° The court deferred
to the decision of the agency because the EPA's reasoning was
supported by "well-settled principles of federal Indian law." '231 The
court further explained that states are "precluded from exercising
jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country unless Congress has
clearly expressed an intention to permit it.232
B. Clean Air Act
In Washington Department of Ecology, the Ninth Circuit relied
on its 1981 decision in Nance v. EPA233 to uphold Congress'
delegation of environmental regulatory jurisdiction on tribal lands,
stating that tribal interests in managing reservations and the
federal policy of encouraging tribes to either assume or share in
responsibility for environmental jurisdiction were controlling. 2 4 The
Nance decision, which came ten years before the addition of TAS
status to the Clean Air Act, was pivotal. The Clean Air Act permits
the EPA to allow tribal nations to set air quality goals on their
reservations. Despite the absence of any specific delegation
language within the Clean Air Act, the EPA promulgated
regulations deferring to tribes2 35 based on congressional intent.236
227. 752 F.2d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1985).
228. Id. at 1469-70.
229. Id. at 1471.
230. Id. at 1467-68.
231. Id. at 1469.
232. Id. at 1469.
233. Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 714 (9th Cir. 1981).
234. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 752 F.2d at 1471-72.
235. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c) (1975) (outlining specific procedures whereby a tribal governing
body could redesignate its reservation as requiring higher air quality standards).
236. Congress was well aware of the tribal issue and specifically intended redesignation to
occur on tribal lands. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-127, reprinted in Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
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Delegation language, however, should not have been necessary
anyway because tribes have inherent sovereignty over their natural
resources, including the air they breathe.
The court did not appear to find the absence of a specific
provision delegating authority to tribes troublesome. Acknowledging
that both courts and the federal government have traditionally
recognized tribes as "possessing important attributes of
sovereignty," '237 the Ninth Circuit refused to subordinate the tribal
interests to the state interest, stating, "within the ... context of
reciprocal impact of air quality standards on land use, the states
and Indian tribes occupying federal reservations stand on
substantially equal footing."2 The court also dismissed any notion
that tribal power should be curtailed because a tribe's decision could
have impacts beyond the borders of its reservation. 239 Although the
court recognized that some tribal attributes of sovereignty had been
diminished by clear congressional action, the tribal right to exclude
non-members from reservations remains strong. 21° If a tribe may
exercise control over entrance of people onto their reservation, the
court reasoned that a tribe should also have the authority to
exercise control over the entrance of pollutants onto its
211reservation.
In 2000, the D.C. Circuit decided Arizona Public Service Co.
v. EPA.242 In that case, the court held that Congress had delegated
air quality authority to tribal nations over privately owned fee lands
located within a reservation as long as the tribe has inherent
jurisdiction over them.243 Additionally, the court found that the
Clean Air Act allows the EPA to treat a tribal nation in a manner
similar to that of a state for regulating air resources "within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation or other areas within the
tribe's jurisdiction. 244
1977, 1409 (1977) (explicitly stating that "Indian Tribes are authorized" to redesignate lands
as requiring higher air quality standards).
237. Nance, 645 F.2d at 713 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) and
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1976)).
238. Id. at 714.
239. Id. at 714-15.
240. Id. at 715 (citing Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 410-11 (9th Cir.
1976)).
241. Id.
242. 211 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
243. Id.
244. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(B) (2003).
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C. Clean Water Act
In City of Albuquerque v. Browner, the Tenth Circuit held that
the EPA reasonably interpreted Section 518 of the Clean Water Act
to permit tribes to adopt water quality standards more stringent
than federal standards and to enforce those standards against
upstream point sources located beyond tribal boundaries.245 The
EPA granted the Isleta Pueblo Indian Tribe TAS status to
administer water quality standards and to certify compliance with
such standards.246 When the court ruled in favor of the tribe, this
case made it clear that TAS tribes would be afforded rights and
powers identical to those of states for the purposes of the CWA
within the Tenth Circuit.
In Montana v. EPA,247 (discussed above) the Ninth Circuit
upheld EPA regulations granting Indian tribes authority to
promulgate water quality standards applicable to effluent sources
controlled by non-Indians owning fee interests in land located
within the reservation. The Ninth Circuit drew heavily upon the
second exception established by the Montana v. U.S. case in 1981
and subsequent cases that applied that decision.24
The court felt a particular need to distinguish its decision from
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation.249
Brendale was decided eight years after Montana v. U.S. and none of
the three opinions in Brendale agreed on an approach for applying
the second Montana exception. In light of this confusion, some
scholars felt that Brendale abrogated Montana.25 ° The Ninth Circuit
however, distinguished its decision in Montana v. EPA from
Brendale, explaining that Brendale was about zoning where
"impacts are normally discrete and localized, whereas water
pollution creates environmental health risks that may affect many
people miles from the source." '251 Thus, the second Montana
245. 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996).
246. As outlined in sections 303 and 401 of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313, 1341 (2003).
Albuquerque ("the City") was running a waste treatment facility operating under a federal
permit (New Mexico is one of the states not authorized to administer its own NPDES permit
system. EPA, State Permit Status, at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last updated
Apr. 14, 2003)) that discharged effluent into the Rio Grande five miles north of the
reservation. City of Albuquerque, 97 F.3d at 419. The City filed suit against the EPA
challenging the tribe's ability to set standards more stringent than the federal limits and the
application of tribal standards beyond the reservation's boundaries. Id.
247. Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945 (N.D.M. 1996).
248. See, e.g., id.
249. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
250. Regina Cutler, Comment, To Clear the Muddy Waters: Tribal Authority Under Section
518 of the Clean Water Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 721, 728 (1999).
251. Montana, 941 F. Supp. at 953 n7. The EPA reads Brendale as not abrogating the
Montana test. The court simply did not reach a consensus on how to apply the facts of
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exception applies because pollution of non-Indian lands within the
reservation could have a grave impact upon tribal health and
environmental interest.
In Wisconsin v. EPA, the state brought an action against the
EPA challenging their granting of TAS status to the Mole Lake
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians.252 The tribe applied for
TAS status in 1994 and Wisconsin opposed the application on the
grounds that the state was "sovereign over all of the navigable
waters in the state, including those on the reservation, and that its
sovereignty precluded any tribal regulation. ' 253 Nevertheless, the
EPA approved the tribe's application in September 1995 and
Wisconsin filed suit soon thereafter.254
Wisconsin challenged only one requirement of the TAS status -
the tribe's inherent authority to regulate water quality.255
Specifically, the state was concerned about lakes on the reservation.
The State of Wisconsin owns the lakebeds, but they are surrounded
by reservation land. The Seventh Circuit held that despite the fact
that the land under the water was not Indian-owned land, the tribes
still had the right to regulate the water because it was within the
borders of the reservation. 256 The court explained that the CWA
"explicitly gives authority over waters within the borders of the
reservation to the tribe and does not even discuss ownership
rights. 257
The Seventh Circuit is the first thus far to explicitly note that in
the absence of TAS status, the federal government would have
jurisdiction over tribal lands, not states. In dicta, the court draws on
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians258 to assert that "the
EPA and not the state of Wisconsin might well be the proper
authority to administer Clean Water Act programs for the
reservation because state laws may usually be applied to Indians on
their reservation only if Congress so expressly provides. 2 9
It seems clear that the EPA has jurisdiction in the absence of an
approved TAS program as acknowledged by the EPA and several
scholars. 260 However, in general, states enforce their permit
Brendale to Montana. Amendments, supra note 126, at 64,877.
252. 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001).
253. Id. at 745.
254. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001).
255. Interestingly, this is the only issue states are allowed to comment on during the Notice
and Comment period for a TAS application, Amendments, supra note 126. It is unclear
however whether states can bring up additional issues in judicial challenges.
256. Wisconsin, 266 F.3d at 747.
257. Id.
258. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
259. Wisconsin, 266 F.3d at 747.
260. See, e.g., Grijalva, supra note 82, at 437.
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programs and water quality standards on tribal land. The Clean Air
Act is more explicit in recognizing potential federal program
implementation. It provides that "in any case in which [the EPA]
determines that the treatment of Indian tribes as identical to States
is inappropriate or administratively infeasible, [the EPA] may
provide, by regulation, other means by which [the EPA] will directly
administer such provisions so as to achieve the appropriate
purpose." '261  The CWA in section 518(e) addresses direct
implementation only by authorizing treatment of tribes as states "to
the degree necessary to carry out the objectives" of the Act.262
Supposedly, absent federally approved tribal programs, the EPA
does implement and enforce programs.26
D. Summary
Congress has clearly been working to expand environmental
laws to acknowledge tribal sovereignty over natural resources. In
nearly every case, Congress has delegated authority to the EPA to
promulgate regulations to help carry out these congressional goals
of promoting tribal sovereignty. Generally, when courts review these
laws and their accompanying regulations, they defer to agency
interpretation. This consistent pattern of deference may not always
be appropriate, however. Courts are stopping their analysis at the
agency interpretation instead of more fully exploring congressional
intent. Deferring to agency interpretation is easier for courts than
interpreting the complex area of law known as tribal sovereignty.
Because of this morass created by decades of conflicting laws and
policies, courts can simplify their analysis by deferring to agencies.
At times agency deference leads to a result that benefits tribes, but
it still ignores the basic congressional acknowledgment of tribal
sovereignty accompanied by clear delegation of authority to exercise
jurisdiction over their natural resources.
VII. EPA ADMINISTRATION OF TAS PROGRAM
Despite the benefits to tribes, very few tribal governments are
presently administering their own programs or setting their own
water quality standards. Only twenty-three tribes have set their
own water-quality standards and no tribes administer permitting
programs.264 This is alarming given that over 145 tribes are
261. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(4) (2003).
262. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2003).
263. Charlotte Uram & Mary J. Decker, Jurisdiction Over Water Quality on Native Lands,
8 J. NAT. RESOURCES ENVTL L. 1, 9 (1992/1993).
264. EPA website, Repository ofDocuments, at http://www.epa.gov/ost/standards/wqslibrary/
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approved for TAS status under the Clean Water Act.265 There are
multiple points in the process where tribes meet roadblocks. First
tribes must obtain TAS status. Although 145 tribes have gained
TAS status, this is but a fraction of the number of tribes in the
United States. Once tribes obtain TAS status, they must then apply
for approval of water quality standards. This process is rather
straightforward and undemanding. Tribal standard setting does not
require a complex permitting program. It does not require much
infrastructure. Additionally, there is not much incentive for tribes
to attain TAS status unless they intend to either set their own water
quality standards or administer their own permitting programs.
Thus, it seems that the key stage where tribes endure delay is in the
conversion of TAS status into something meaningful.
It is not clear why more tribes have not obtained TAS status or
why TAS applications are being delayed. In general, the EPA is slow
to process applications. For example, NPDES permits take an
average of five years to gain approval.266 The tribal applications may
be delayed because the EPA is uncertain what it wants to do with
them, not because the tribes do not meet the necessary
requirements. In essence, there seems to be a freeze on applications
right now because the EPA is still developing its policy.267
Some speculate that the EPA's hesitance is due to a fear of the
patchwork nature of allotted lands.26 Because the EPA does not
believe that there has been a clear federal delegation of authority,
the extent of tribal jurisdiction is not immediately evident to it. The
EPA may be worried about the actual make-up of the population on
reservations. The Wisconsin case was easy because the reservation
was largely unallotted and nearly all inhabitants were tribal
members. The discussion gets trickier, however, when lands are
heavily allotted. In Montana v. EPA however, the court declined to
draw a distinction based upon the ethnic make-up of the
reservation, instead deferring to EPA's drawing of simple
geographical lines for jurisdictional purposes.26
(last updated Nov. 2, 2004).
265. Drucker, supra note 90, at 343-44.
266. EPA website, Backlog Reduction, at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/permitissuance
backlog.cfm (last updated Oct. 17, 2003).
267. Conversation with Curtis Berkey, Bay Area Federal Indian Law Practitioner
(November 2002) (on file with author).
268. Id.
269. Stuckey points out that the EPA's declining to consider the make-up of reservation
inhabitants is well in keeping with the notion of treating tribes as states. "This also seems
consistent with the manner in which other states are treated since ethnic populations are not
a typical consideration in EPA's regulatory scheme on environmental issues." 31 ELR 11,198.
[Vol. 20:1
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Some may argue that the EPA does not go far enough in
assisting tribes to gain TAS status and thus frustrates congressional
intent. Others would likely argue that it goes too far by misreading
case law and giving too much power to tribes. The first reading is
the most appropriate in light of the plain language of the statute
and the history of Indian law. Principles of judicial review require
courts to defer to agency experience, expertise, and interpretation
of governing statutes when statutes and congressional intent are
ambiguous.27 ° By creating an established system for tribal
administration of programs and declaring that tribes can attain the
same status as states, the congressional delegation to tribes is
unquestionable here.
In the classic Chevron case, the Supreme Court explained that
when interpreting a statute, a court should look first to the clear
congressional intent.271 If congressional intent is not clear, courts
defer to the reasonable interpretations of the agencies that enforce
the Act.272 In this case, it is not necessary to reach the agency
deference question because the congressional intent is clear.
Although Congress does not delegate its duties beyond federal
bodies lightly and delegation should never be assumed, it is present
here. This finding is unsurprising in light of the inherent
characteristics of sovereignty possessed by tribes. Courts have
recognized congressional delegation to tribes based upon the
established nature of tribes, their stand-alone governments, and
their status as domestic dependent nations.273
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING TAS PROGRAMS
Tribal governments are the appropriate entities to regulate
water quality on reservations. They have inherent sovereignty over
their natural resources and as the most local unit of government,
they are most familiar with tribal needs and challenges. The
Treatment as State provision of the Clean Water Act can be viewed
two ways: (1) as a congressional recognition of tribal authority over
on-reservation waterways; or (2) a congressional delegation of
federal power to regulate waterways. The first view is the most
appropriate. Tribes have consistently exercised authority over their
natural resources and have not clearly ceded the right to control
water quality to the federal government. Additionally, the language
of section 518 can be read as a recognition of already existing
270. See, e.g., Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 714-15 (9th Cir. 1981).
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authority. If however, section 518 is seen as a delegation of tribal
authority, there will be several implications for tribal courts
enforcing the Clean Water Act.
A. Tribes have Inherent Authority Over Water Quality
The CWA does not give tribes something that they did not
already have, rather it merely recognizes inherent tribal authority.
Tribes have authority over their water resources based on: (1)
aboriginal title; (2) their inherent sovereign powers; and (3) the
failure of tribes to cede that power (also called the "reserved rights
doctrine"). These three elements of Indian law provide alternative
means of asserting sovereignty over water quality in the absence of
federal delegation.
1. Aboriginal Title
Tribes retain title to their water and submerged lands and
sovereignty over natural resources unless they have specifically
ceded these lands and rights to others. Even absent treaties and
statutes, tribes have the right to possess and occupy their ancestral
homelands. This property right is different from a fee simple right
to land and is called "aboriginal title." '274 The federal government is
the only entity that may extinguish aboriginal title, and it must do
so explicitly with a clear, unambiguous statement of intent to
extinguish.275
Aboriginal title is rooted in the idea that the tribes inhabited
this land before European settlers arrived. Chief Justice John
Marshall described this concept in the 1832 Worcester v. Georgia
case."6 There, Justice Marshall indicated that tribes had always
been considered distinct and independent political communities.
They were the "undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial.,,277 The Court had earlier, in 1823, defined Indian
property rights as a right of occupancy.27 However, there was little
distinction made between an Indian right of occupancy and the fee
title ownership settlers enjoyed. Indeed, the Court referred to these
property rights as equally sacred.279
274. Fee title to the land generally remains in the federal government or, in the case of the
original thirteen states, in the state. 42"C.J.S. Indians § 69 (2002).
275. Id.
276. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
277. Id. at 559.
278. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587 (1823).
279. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1835).
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The right of occupancy need not be specifically recognized in a
statute or formal government action or declaration to be enforced.2"'
To establish aboriginal title, tribes much occupy lands identified as
their ancestral home. 2"1 An Indian tribe must show that it actually,
exclusively, and continuously used the property for an extended
period.2 2 This means that tribes without a reservation or tribes that
have been relocated will be unable to assert aboriginal title
successfully. Additionally, because tribes must have exclusively and
continuously used the property, 2 3  it may be difficult for
traditionally nomadic tribes to show continual occupancy of the land
in question.
Although not all tribes will be able to assert aboriginal title for
their reservations or in particular for their waterways, it is a
doctrine that many tribes can invoke to lend credence to their
claims of inherent sovereign authority over the waterways on their
lands. The concept of aboriginal title has been used to support
claims to other Indian lands. For example, the Oneida tribe
successfully invoked this theory to bring an action against the State
of New York. Tribal representatives had ceded lands to the state
without federal consent. The Supreme Court held that the federal
government protects the Oneida's "possessory right" to tribal
lands. 4
Additionally, aboriginal title can assist tribes in securing TAS
status. One of the difficulties for tribes who are trying to draw upon
TAS opportunities is the showing that the land and waters in
question are under their inherent authority. Aboriginal title settles
this question by acknowledging that tribes hold clear title to their
resources where the title has not been ceded by the tribe or
explicitly extinguished by Congress.
2 5
2. Inherent Sovereign Rights over Natural Resources
Different views of reservations affect the status of tribal rights.
If one looks at tribal lands and rights as something granted by the
federal government, then a tribe is less likely to have the right to
280. Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923).
281. Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945); United
States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
282. Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians v. United States, 383 F.2d 991, 998 (1976).
283. Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v. South Dakota, 796 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1986).
284. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
285. Congress does have the right to extinguish this right of occupancy and with it any
remnants of aboriginal title. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 669
(1974); see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978). Additionally, if Congress
does extinguish title, there is no legal obligation to compensate the tribe. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians
v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955).
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control their water quality. However, this is not the general view of
tribal reservations. Indeed, reservations are not grants by the
federal government but grants by the tribes to the federal
government.8 6 Under this lens, the tribes hold all rights not
specifically given away. Thus, unless a treaty or agreement
specifically relinquishes water quality rights, the tribe retains
rights of ownership and control. Because tribes generally did not
cede the ability to exercise sovereignty over their water quality, that
sovereignty is still present.287
3. Treatment as State = Treatment as a Sovereign
The phrase "treatment as state" which is used in the Clean
Water Act and other environmental statutes indicates that Congress
was recognizing inherent tribal authority. In the absence of
congressional action based on constitutional provisions, state control
their natural resources and regulate water on their lands. There is
no need for the federal government to delegate enforcement power
to states because state have that power. As explained by the Tenth
Amendment, all power not explicitly granted to the federal
government remains with the states.288 Thus, viewing tribes through
the same lens we view states yields not a federal delegation of
power, but a recognition of already existing power. Section 518 is
clear from its very title that it is about a sovereign power. These
CWA amendments served to promote a cooperative federalism
relationship between tribes and the federal government to mirror
the one that exists between states and the federal government.
B. Congress Has Delegated Clean Water Act Authority to Tribes
Although tribes have inherent authority over their water
quality, their ability to enforce standards and permitting programs
in the absence of congressional action has not been not clear. The
purpose of section 518 of the CWA is to safeguard tribes' rights to
enforce their water quality standards. The EPA has not read this
statute or the congressional intent behind it correctly. The EPA has
neither recognized the congressional recognition of inherent tribal
286. For a clear expression of this notion, often called the "reserved rights doctrine," see
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (explaining that a treaty is not "a grant of
rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them - a reservation of those not granted.").
287. Some commentators have asserted that the Ninth Circuit established a new Montana-
type exception allowing for exercise of tribal jurisdiction over waterbodies on Indian
reservations created before statehood for tribes that are historically dependent on fisheries.
This newly created exception, however, would only help a limited number of tribes who meet
those specific requirements.
288. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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authority nor found a delegation of federal law. The EPA should
issue new guidance documents and regulations. There is no need for
the EPA to draw upon Montana to justify a tribe's right to enforce
water quality standards because Congress clearly explained that
enforcement authority belongs with tribes under section 518. The
EPA should issue a new rulemaking reflecting this understanding.
Establishment of tribal authority should then accelerate the process
of EPA approval of tribal standards and permitting programs.
The EPA's current reading overlooks the plain language of the
Act and thereby limits the ability of tribes to gain TAS status.
Further, once tribes gain TAS status, the EPA has been reluctant
to make that status meaningful by approving the water quality
standards set by tribes. This frustrates the intent of Congress,
which is evident from the small number of tribes who have attained
TAS status compared to the long waiting list of tribes who desire the
status. Congress was clear in its intent to establish a program
whereby tribes could regulate their own resources, but agency
frustration of purpose has led to narrow regulations.
If there is the inherent tribal authority to regulate water quality
is not recognized, the only other possible reading of section 518 is as
a clear delegation of federal enforcement authority. At a minimum,
the EPA should recognize the congressional intent to allow tribes
full exercise of potential CWA enforcement authority.
1. Congressional Delegation Invokes the Full Bill of Rights
If the TAS status and the rights and responsibilities that
accompany it are a congressional delegation of power to the tribe,
tribes should be operating under federal authority. When Congress
delegates federal authority, tribes must operate as the federal
government would operate in the situation.
Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968289 imposes most of
the requirements of the Bill of Rights upon the tribes in the exercise
of their jurisdiction, it did not extend the full Bill of Rights
requirements to tribal governments.29 ° This single fact, combined
289. 25 U.S.C.A. §1301 (2004).
290. This law was specifically designed to bring most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
to tribes. The principle guarantees of the act are in section 1302. Although the act adopts most
of the rights verbatim, it leaves out some notable areas. (1) There is no provision prohibiting
the establishment of religion by a tribe. (2) Tribes are not required to supply counsel to
indigents at tribal expense even if prosecution may result in imprisonment. See also
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Additionally, although ICRA may contain the same
language as the Bill of Rights, tribal courts are not bound by Supreme Court precedents and
they may interpret the provisions differently. See, e.g., Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975); Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court,
841 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1988). ICRA has also been interpreted to require exhaustion of tribal
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with the inapplicability of the Fourteenth Amendment in tribal
actions,291 leads states and non-members to worry about their
potential treatment in tribal courts. However, this concern falls by
the wayside with the acknowledgement that tribal enforcement
under the Act is a delegation of federal power to tribes. If a tribe is
acting under the aegis of the federal government, it must enforce
accordingly to federal standards. Thus, tribal courts must observe
due process and enforce all other constitutional rights. If the federal
government were enforcing the Clean Water Act, it would of course
be operating under the Constitution. If tribes are acting under
congressional authority, the Constitution is also triggered. This
possibility has not yet been discussed seriously or put into play by
tribes or federal officials. A concern that would arise, of course,
would be funding. Currently, for example, tribal governments do not
provide court appointed lawyers. Although most dischargers are
larger companies and municipalities and would not likely desire or
qualify for court appointed attorneys, tribal governments would
need to request more resources from the federal government to
ensure that all parties' constitutional rights are upheld.
2. Venue Options
a. Removal
Removal is possible in federal tribal actions in the same way it
could be used when a non-resident is called before a state court.
This means that many parties brought before a tribal court could
petition for removal to a federal court because there would be
diversity of citizenship and the case would turn upon a federal law
(the Act). This change of venue should alleviate concerns about non-
Indians being subjected to tribal courts.
b. Enforcement of Tribal Laws in Federal Courts
One solution to this dilemma is for tribes to bring enforcement
actions directly in federal courts bypassing their own tribal systems.
Tribes could bring enforcement actions in federal courts and based
on choice of law rules the court should be required to apply tribal
remedies before parties can seek redress in federal courts. E.g., O'Neal v. Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe, 482 U.S. F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973); McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir.
1974).
291. Because tribes are not "states," the Fourteenth Amendment is not triggered. However,
courts have acknowledged that non-Indians in tribal courts are protected by the guarantees
of ICRA. Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969). However, the Supreme Court has
held that habeas corpus is the sole remedy by which federal courts could enforce ICRA. Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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law. The Clean Water Act does not require tribes to bring actions in
tribal courts. Indeed, diversity jurisdiction would likely be a
common occurrence. When the EPA approves water quality
standards set by tribes, those standards become enforceable federal
law.292 When non-tribal members are prosecuted in federal court,
concerns about constitutional rights and judicial prejudice
disappear.
Tribal governments may not be amenable to this solution.
Besides the clear insulting suggestion that tribal courts as
inadequate, tribes would be forced to submit to a different
sovereign's interpretations of its law. Although the tribes should not
be bound by a non-tribal courts interpretation, in reality federal
courts will end up building up a federal tribal common law. Tribal
laws and traditions are not necessarily rooted in the same common
law tradition as the courts of the federal government and the states.
Thus, federal interpretation of tribal law may be both inappropriate
and insulting.
IX. CONCLUSION
The move to recognize tribal sovereignty within environmental
laws is a good one. Tribal sovereignty over air and water quality is
not something to be bestowed by the federal government. As
independent nations with their own land and governance structure,
tribes should not have to invoke U.S. laws to assert their right to
regulate their land and resources. Some commentators have argued
that tribal rights to govern their land, air, and water are inherent
rights of a sovereign that the tribes have retained in absence of
treaties clearly ceding these rights. Although this is persuasive,
tribes are much more likely to win the legislative battle over control
of their resources by invoking positive federal environmental laws.
These sentiments and concerns inspire the suggestions presented in
this article. This article offers suggestions and recommendations to
make tribal governance more palatable to courts, states, and the
federal government. While these recommendations can lead to a
smoother system were tribes can more easily set their own water
quality standards and establish permitting programs, the
suggestions are in some ways offensive. Much as a resident of
California must submit to Arizona laws while in that state, non-
tribal members should be required to submit to tribal laws while on
tribal land. Tribal courts should be recognized as valid courts. This
292. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 104-10 (1992); Dean B. Suagee & John P.
Lowndes, Due Process and Public Participation in Tribal Environmental Programs, 13 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1999).
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article instead, however, presents a compromise. By allowing their
laws to be enforced in federal courts, tribal governments can observe
their laws and standards gain deference. That is at least some
victory.
